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This dissertation studies the implications of housing market heterogeneity for the trans-
mission of shocks, welfare and the conduct of monetary policy.
In the rst chapter I focus on mortgage contract heterogeneity (xed vs. variable-rate
mortgages). I develop and solve a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model that features a housing market and a group of constrained individuals who need
housing collateral to obtain loans. A given proportion of constrained households borrows
at a variable rate, while the rest borrows at a xed rate. The model predicts that in an
economy with mostly variable-rate mortgages, an exogenous interest rate shock has larger
e¤ects on borrowers than in a xed-rate economy. For plausible parametrizations, aggregate
di¤erences are muted by wealth e¤ects on labor supply and by the presence of savers. More
persistent shocks cause larger aggregate di¤erences. From a normative perspective I nd
that, in the presence of collateral constraints, the optimal Taylor rule is less aggressive
against ination than in the standard sticky-price model. Furthermore, for given monetary
policy, a high proportion of xed-rate mortgages is welfare enhancing.
Then, I develop a two-country version of the model to study the implications of housing
market heterogeneity for a monetary union as well as costs and benets of being in a
monetary union when there are asymmetric shocks. Results show that consumption reacts
more strongly to common shocks in countries with high loan-to-value ratios (LTVs), a
high proportion of borrowers or variable-rate mortgages. I also nd that country-specic
housing price shocks increase consumption not only in the country where the shock takes
place. Welfare analysis shows that housing-market homogeneization is not benecial per se,
only when it is towards low LTVs or predominantly xed-rate mortgages. As for costs and
benets of monetary unions, when there is a technology shock in one of the countries and
they are symmetric, the monetary union regime is welfare worsening. However, results are
dependent on whether or not countries are symmetric and on the source of the asymmetry.
1 Fixed and Variable-Rate Mortgages, Business Cycles and
Monetary Policy
Abstract1
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I study how the proportion of xed and variable-
rate mortgages in an economy can a¤ect the way shocks are propagated. Second, I analyze
optimal implementable simple monetary policy rules and the welfare implications of this
proportion. I develop and solve a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model that features a housing market and a group of constrained individuals who need
housing collateral to obtain loans. A given proportion of constrained households borrows at
a variable rate, while the rest borrows at a xed rate. The model predicts that in an economy
with mostly variable-rate mortgages, an exogenous interest rate shock has larger e¤ects on
borrowers than in a xed-rate economy. Aggregate e¤ects are also larger for the variable-
rate economy. For plausible parametrizations, di¤erences are muted by wealth e¤ects on
labor supply and by the presence of savers. More persistent shocks, such as ination target
and technology shocks, cause larger aggregate di¤erences. From a normative perspective I
nd that, in the presence of collateral constraints, the optimal Taylor rule is less aggressive
against ination than in the standard sticky-price model. Furthermore, for given monetary
policy, a high proportion of xed-rate mortgages is welfare enhancing.
Keywords: Fixed/Variable-rate mortgages, monetary policy, housing market, collateral con-
straint
1Part of this project was developed during my dissertation internships at the St. Louis Fed and
the Federal Reserve Board, whose hospitality I gratefully acknowledge. I am highly indebted to
Fabio Ghironi, Matteo Iacoviello and Peter Ireland for their help and advice. Thanks to seminar
participants of the Dissertation Workshop at BC, R@BC, University of Valencia, University of
Barcelona and WEAI for useful suggestions. And special thanks to Susanto Basu, Bill Dupor, Simon
Gilchrist, Michael Kiley, Andreas Lehnert, Antonio Miralles, Ed Nelson and Michael Palumbo. All
errors are mine. This paper was previously circulated under the name "Fixed and Variable-Rate
Mortgages and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism"
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" [:::]the structure of mortgage contracts may matter for consumption behavior. In coun-
tries like the United Kingdom, for example, where most mortgages have adjustable rates,
changes in short-term interest rates have an almost immediate e¤ect on household cash
ows. [:::] In an economy where most mortgages carry xed rates, such as the United States,
that channel of e¤ect may be more muted. I do not think we know at this point whether, in
the case of households, these e¤ects are quantitatively signicant in the aggregate. Certainly,
these issues seem worthy of further study". Ben Bernanke, June 15, 2007.
1.1 Introduction
Mortgage contracts in an economy can be xed or variable rate. The proportion of variable-
rate mortgages varies from country to country. In countries such as the United States,
Germany and France, the majority of mortgages are xed rate. However, the predominant
type of mortgages in countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia and Spain is variable.
Mortgage rate changes a¤ect the amount of mortgage interest payments, causing a di-
rect cash-ow e¤ect on consumption. Interest rate changes also a¤ect housing demand
and housing prices. If households are using housing as a collateral, the value of this col-
lateral changes, inducing a wealth e¤ect on household behavior and indirectly a¤ecting
consumption (ECB (2003), HM Treasury (2003)). Interest rate shocks a¤ect mortgage
rates di¤erently depending on whether the mortgage is xed or variable rate. Variable-rate
mortgages are mortgage loans for which the interest rate is adjusted periodically, typically
in line with some measured short-term interest rate. Hence, interest rate shocks directly
a¤ect variable rates. In contrast, xed-rate mortgages are mortgage loans for which the
interest rate remains constant through the term of the loan. The xed interest rate is tied
to a longer-term interest rate and is less sensitive to changes in the policy rate.
This raises important questions: How does the mortgage rate structure a¤ect the way
macroeconomic shocks are propagated? What are the implications in terms of monetary
policy and welfare? These questions are of academic and policy interest. To give an illustra-
tive example, the United Kingdom Treasury explicitly mentions the di¤erence in mortgage
5
structures as an important reason not to join the euro area. In the UK, the vast majority of
borrowers have variable-rate mortgages, as opposed to the large countries of the euro area.
According to the UK Treasury, British households are more exposed to monetary policy
changes than, say, German households (HM Treasury (2003), Miles (2004)).
To address these questions, I build a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model with housing and collateral constraints to explore how shocks are propagated
in the presence of mortgage heterogeneity. I introduce xed and variable-rate mortgages
in the model. For the proportion of variable-rate mortgages to matter via the direct, cash-
ow e¤ect of mortgage interest payments on consumption, borrowers and savers are needed.
Then, the e¤ect of interest rate changes on borrowing does not cancel out by the presence of
a representative consumer. For the indirect, wealth e¤ect to appear, one needs non-durable
consumption to be related to house prices. The introduction of collateral constraints tied
to housing value for one type of consumers solves both problems since it motivates the
presence of borrowers and savers and relates housing prices to consumption. In this model,
monetary policy has real e¤ects that are comparable with other sticky-price models. Fur-
thermore, since the model is microfounded it allows me to study optimal monetary policy
and welfare.2
It is not the aim of this paper to explain how the decision between xed and variable-
rate mortgages is made.3 For simplicity, I hold the proportion of xed and variable-rate
borrowers constant and exogenous. Although this proportion can vary in reality, there is
evidence that it uctuates around a constant mean which is higher or lower depending on
the country.4 We could think of these cross-country di¤erences as due to institutional,
historical or cultural factors, out of the scope of this model.5
I use the model to compute impulse responses to interest rate, ination target and
2The analysis of optimal monetary policy is restricted to optimization over parameters of a simple im-
plementable Taylor rule.
3See Miles (2004) or Campbell and Cocco (2003) for studies that cover this from a microeconomic per-
spective.
4See Appendix 1 for evidence for the UK and the US.
5The European Mortgage Federation (EMF) highlights that cultural di¤erences play an important role
for the predominant type of mortgage contract in a country. They are linked to real estate law, borrowers
risk aversion, funding system or frequency of house moves.
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technology shocks. I consider two extreme cases; one in which the economy is composed by
variable-rate borrowers and one where the xed rate is the predominant type of mortgage.
Results show that interest rate shocks a¤ect more strongly those borrowers that have
variable-rate mortgages. Given an increase in the interest rate set by the central bank,
variable-rate borrowers reduce their consumption and housing demand by more than xed-
rate borrowers. The intuition is as follows: After a monetary policy shock (increase in the
interest rate), xed and variable-rate consumers di¤er in the real interest rate they face.
Consider the most extreme case in which the variable rate changes one for one with the
interest rate set by the central bank and the xed rate is constant. After the shock, the
nominal mortgage rate increases for the variable-rate individuals and ination decreases.
For the xed-rate borrowers, the nominal mortgage interest rate does not react, but ination
is still decreasing because the economy is contracting. As a result, real rates increase by
more if the mortgage is variable rate. In real terms, payments are increasing by more
for variable-rate consumers, and their consumption and housing decrease by more (this is
a pure cash-ow e¤ect). A second, wealth e¤ect comes through the collateral constraint.
Banks are willing to lend as long as debt repayments do not exceed a xed proportion of the
value of the house collateral. For borrowers with variable-rate mortgages the value of their
collateral has been reduced by more since they are demanding less houses. These e¤ects
make consumption decrease more strongly for variable-rate borrowers.
Aggregate consumption also declines by more after a monetary policy shock when the
economy is mainly borrowing at a variable rate. However, aggregate di¤erences are more
muted due to the behavior of savers. In equilibrium, borrowing and saving must be equal. If
borrowing decreases, saving must also decrease. Savers are the owners of nancial interme-
diaries in the model, so any loss for the borrowers is a gain for the savers. These manage to
o¤set part of the decrease in consumption following a positive interest rate shock. Results
for monetary policy shocks are very robust to di¤erent model specications.
Some aggregate di¤erences arise because the borrowersmarginal propensity to consume
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is larger than the savers.6 However, aggregate di¤erences are not large because interest rate
shocks are not very persistent. Also, income e¤ects on labor supply are important in this
model. With the type of preferences used in standard real business cycle models, labor e¤ort
is determined together with the intertemporal consumption choice. When consumption is
reduced, individuals tend to work more to compensate and smooth consumption. Using
preferences as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988)(GHH henceforth), this e¤ect
is eliminated. In this case, the channels that are important for the purposes of this paper
are emphasized and aggregate e¤ects are larger.
In contrast, ination target shocks generate larger aggregate di¤erences between sce-
narios. In particular, when the ination target increases, output responds by more when
variable rates are predominant. Real interest rates fall persistently and house prices increase
by less than with xed mortgage rates. Variable-rate borrowers increase their nondurable
consumption by more. Since house prices do not increase as much in the variable-rate case,
also savers can consume more nondurables.
Finally, I consider technology shocks. A favorable technology shock increases output
and lowers prices. Monetary policy responds in a persistent way and real rates increase.
Variable-rate borrowers consume less because the real rate increase a¤ects them and damp-
ens the positive e¤ects of the technology shock for them. The increase in real rates does
not a¤ect xed-rate consumers as much and they can consume more. Output increases by
more when xed rates are predominant.
I also study welfare and optimal monetary policy in the context of xed and variable
rate mortgages. In particular, I search over parameters of a simple, implementable interest
rate rule so that welfare is maximized. I nd that, in the presence of collateral constraints, a
social welfare maximizing central bank should respond to ination less aggressively than in
the absence of collateral constraints. Results also show that when the central bank focuses
only on the saverswelfare, thus ignoring the collateral constraint, the optimized ination
parameter in the Taylor rule is higher. However, when borrowers are taking into account,
6 In this model borrowers face collateral constraints and are more impatient than savers. This makes their
consumption respond by more to changes in wealth.
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the central bank optimally responds less to ination. The central bank faces a trade-o¤
between the borrowers and saverswelfare because on the one hand, low ination corrects
the sticky-price distortion but, on the other hand, ination relaxes the collateral constraint
and improves borrowerswelfare. Comparing welfare across mortgage rate scenarios for
given policy shows that this ination channel is more e¤ective the higher the proportion
of xed-rate mortgages in the economy. Therefore, borrowers are better o¤ with xed-rate
mortgages although this comes at the cost of lower welfare for savers. For aggregate welfare,
I nd that predominantly xed-rate contracts are welfare enhancing.
This paper relates to di¤erent strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature
on New Keynesian general equilibrium models with housing and collateral constraints such
as Aoki et al. (2004) and Iacoviello (2005), who do not consider heterogeneous mortgage
contracts. Second, it is also related to a literature that studies xed and variable-rate
mortgages. Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Miles (2004) study the xed versus variable
rate choice from a partial equilibrium perspective. Graham and Wright (2007) develop a
model in which some households face binding credit constraints and debt contracts can
be xed or variable rate. However, they do not include a housing market and thus the
constraint is not tied to housing stock and housing prices, eliminating the wealth channel.
Calza et al. (2007) study how institutional factors, including mortgage contracts, can
a¤ect the monetary transmission mechanism. In my model, I focus on xed versus variable
rate mortgages. My results on monetary policy shocks are comparable to theirs under some
parameter specications. Relative to them, I do not only study the exogenous component of
monetary policy but also the systematic response to other shocks. The existent literature is
silent about how mortgage heterogeneity a¤ects the way shocks such as changes in ination
target or technology are propagated. Finally the paper contributes to the literature on
optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous consumers and collateral constraints. See for
instance Monacelli (2006) or Mendicino and Pescatori (2007). However, none of these papers
studies optimal monetary policy in the context of di¤erent mortgage contracts.
Section II explains the basic model I build for the analysis. Section III shows the results
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and dynamics and business cycles of the model. Section IV analyzes optimal monetary
policy. Section V presents the conclusions. Appendix 1 contains graphs and tables on the
empirical evidence mentioned above. Appendix 2 shows model derivations.
1.2 The Baseline Model
I consider an innite-horizon economy in which households consume, work and demand
real estate. There is a representative nancial intermediary that provides mortgages and
accepts deposits from consumers. Firms set prices subject to Calvo (1983)-Yun (1996)
nominal rigidity. The monetary authority sets interest rates endogenously, in response to
ination and output, following a Taylor rule.
1.2.1 The Consumers Problem
There are three types of consumers: unconstrained consumers, constrained consumers who
borrow at a variable rate, and constrained consumers who borrow at a xed rate. Con-
strained individuals need to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from the
nancial intermediary. Interest payments for both mortgages and loans cannot exceed a
proportion of the future value of the current house stock. In this way, the nancial inter-
mediary ensures that borrowers are going to be able to fulll their debt obligations next
period. As in Iacoviello (2005), I assume that constrained consumers are more impatient
than unconstrained ones. This assumption ensures that the borrowing constraint is binding,
so that constrained individuals do not save and wait until they have the funds to self-nance
their consumption. This generates an economy in which households divide into borrowers
and savers. Furthermore, borrowers are divided into two groups, those who borrow at a
xed rate and those who borrow at a variable rate. The proportion of each type of borrower
is xed and exogenous. All households derive utility from consumption, housing services
assumed proportional to the housing stock and leisure.7
7 I do not allow for renting. This is needed to generate borrowers and savers in the economy. If renting
were allowed, borrowers could use renting to save and the wealth e¤ect would disappear. Furthermore, in the
US, homeownerships have been quite high in the last years (about 65 percent, according to the US Census
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Unconstrained Consumers (Savers) Unconstrained consumers maximize:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + j lnH
u
t  
(Lut )



; (1)
where, E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and Cut , Hut and
Lut are consumption at t, the stock of housing and hours worked, respectively; 1= (   1) is
the labor supply elasticity,  > 0 and j > 0 represents the weight of housing in the utility
function.
The budget constraint is:
Cut + qtH
u
t + b
u
t  qtHut 1 + wut Lut +
Rt 1but 1
t
+ F vt + S
v
t ; (2)
where qt is the real housing price and wut is the real wage for unconstrained consumers. These
can buy houses or sell them at the current price qt. I assume zero housing depreciation for
simplicity. As we will see, this group will choose not to borrow at all; they are the savers
in this economy. but is the amount they save. They receive interest Rt 1 for their savings.
t is ination in period t. St and Ft are lump-sum prots received from the rms and the
nancial intermediary, respectively. We can think of these consumers as the wealthy agents
in the economy, who own the rms and the nancial intermediary.
The rst-order conditions for this unconstrained group are:
1
Cut
= Et

Rt
t+1Cut+1

; (3)
wut = (L
u
t )
 1Cut ; (4)
j
Hut
=
1
Cut
qt   Et 1
Cut+1
qt+1: (5)
Bureau).
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Equation (3) is the Euler equation for consumption, equation (4) is the labor-supply condi-
tion, and equation (5) is the Euler equation for housing. This states that the benets from
consuming housing must be equal to the costs at the margin.
Constrained Consumers (Borrowers) Constrained consumers can be of two types:
those who borrow at a variable rate and those who do it at a xed rate. The proportion of
variable-rate consumers is xed and exogenous and equal to  2 [0; 1].
Constrained and unconstrained consumers are di¤erent in the way they discount the
future. Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones. I assume that
constrained consumers face a limit on the debt they can acquire. The maximum amount
they can borrow is proportional to the value of their collateral, in this case the stock of
housing. That is, the debt repayment next period cannot exceed a proportion of tomorrows
value of todays stock of housing:
Et
Rcit
t+1
bcit  kEtqt+1Hcit ; (6)
where i = v if the constrained consumer borrows at a variable rate and i = f if he or she
borrows at a xed rate, and Rcit = Rt if i = v; R
ci
t = Rt if i = f:
Constrained consumers maximize their lifetime utility function subject to the budget
constraint and the collateral constraint:
max E0
1X
t=0
et lnCcit + j lnHcit    Lcit 
!
; (7)
subject to:
Ccit + qtH
ci
t +
Rcit 1bcit 1
t
 qtHcit 1 + wcit Lcit + bcit ; (8)
and (6).8
As noted above, constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones,
8We will see from the rms problem that wcvt = w
cf
t = w
c
t :
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so that e < . This assumption is crucial for the borrowing constraint to be binding and
therefore, for there to be both borrowers and savers in the economy.
The rst-order conditions for constrained consumers are:
1
Ccit
= eEt Rcit
t+1Ccit+1

+ cit R
ci
t ; (9)
wcit =
 
Lcit
 1
Ccit ; (10)
j
Hcit
=
1
Ccit
qt   eEt 1
Ccit+1
qt+1   cit kEtqt+1t+1: (11)
These rst-order conditions di¤er from those of the unconstrained individuals. In the
case of constrained consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint
 
cit

ap-
pears in equations (9) and (11). From the Euler equations for consumption of unconstrained
consumers, we know that R = 1= in steady state. If we combine this result with the Euler
equation for consumption of constrained individuals we have that ci =

   e =Cci > 0
in steady state. This means that the borrowing constraint holds with equality in steady
state. Since we log-linearize the model around the steady state and assume that uncertainty
is low, we can generalize this result to o¤-steady-state dynamics. Then, the borrowing con-
straint is always binding, so that constrained individuals are going to borrow the maximum
amount they are allowed to and unconstrained consumers are never in debt.
Given the borrowing amount implied by (6) at equality, consumption for constrained
individuals can be determined by their ow of funds:
Ccit = w
ci
t L
ci
t + b
ci
t + qt
 
Hcit 1  Hcit
  Rcit 1bcit 1
t
; (12)
and the rst-order condition for housing becomes:
j
Hcit
=
1
Ccit

qt   kEtqt+1t+1
Rcit

  eEt 1
Ccit+1
(1  k) qt+1: (13)
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Aggregate Variables Given the fraction  of variable-rate borrowers, we can dene ag-
gregates across constrained consumers as Cct  Ccvt +(1  )Ccft ; Lct  Lcvt +(1  )Lcft ;Hct 
Hcvt + (1  )Hcft ; bct  bcvt + (1  ) bcft :
Therefore, economy-wide aggregates are: Ct  Cut + Cct ; Lt  Lut + L;Ht  Hut + Hct :
In this model, aggregate supply of housing is xed, so that market clearing requires9: Ht =
Hut +H
c
t = H:
1.2.2 The Financial Intermediary
The nancial intermediary accepts deposits from savers, and extends both xed and variable-
rate loans to borrowers. The prots of the nancial intermediary are:
Ft = Rt 1bcvt 1 + (1  )Rt 1bcft 1  Rt 1but 1: (14)
To simplify, since the typical time horizon of a mortgage is large, I consider the maturity
of mortgages to be innite, although this assumption is not crucial for the dynamics of the
problem.
In equilibrium, aggregate borrowing and saving must be equal, that is,
bct = b
u
t : (15)
Substituting (15) into (54) ;we obtain,
Ft = (1  ) bcft 1
 
Rt 1  Rt 1

: (16)
I assume that the nancial intermediary operates under perfect competition. There-
fore, the optimality condition for the nancial intermediary implies that at each point in
time  , the intermediary is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or xed rate. Hence,
the expected discounted prots that the intermediary obtains by lending new debt in a
9This assumption provides an easy way to specify the supply of housing and have variable prices. A
two-sector model with production of housing does not generate signicatively di¤erent results (see Appendix
2).
14
given period at a xed interest rate must be equal to the expected discounted prots the
intermediary would obtain by lending it at variable rate:
E
1X
i=+1
;iR



bcf   bcf 1

= E
1X
i=+1
;iRi 1

bcf   bcf 1

; (17)
where t;i = i t

Cut
Cut+i

is the unconstrained consumer relevant discount factor. Since
the nancial intermediary is owned by the savers, their stochastic discount factor is applied
to the nancial intermediarys problem.
We can obtain the optimal value of the xed rate in period  from expression (56) :
R

 =
E
1P
i=+1
;iRi 1
E
1P
i=+1
;i
: (18)
Equation (57) states that, for every new debt issued at date  , there is a di¤erent xed
interest rate that has to be equal to a discounted average of future variable interest rates.
Notice that this is not a condition on the stock of debt, but on the new amount obtained
in a given period. New debt at a given point in time is associated with a di¤erent xed
interest rate. Both the xed interest rate in period  and the new amount of debt in period
 are xed for all future periods. However, the xed interest rate varies with the date
the debt was issued, so that in every period there is a new xed interest rate associated
with new debt in this period. If we consider xed-rate loans to be long-term, the nancial
intermediary obtains interest payments every period from the whole stock of debt, not only
from the new ones. Hence, we can dene an aggregate xed interest rate that is the one the
nancial intermediary e¤ectively charges every period. This aggregate xed interest rate is
composed of all past xed interest rates and past debt, together with the current period
optimal xed interest rate and new amount of debt. Therefore, the e¤ective xed interest
rate that the nancial intermediary charges for the stock of xed-rate debt every period is:
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Rt =
Rt 1b
cf
t 1 +R

t

bcft   bcft 1

bcft
: (19)
Equation (58) states that the xed interest rate that the nancial intermediary is actually
charging today is an average of what it charged last period for the previous stock of mort-
gages and what it charges this period for the new amount. Importantly, this assumption is
not crucial for results. Both R

 and Rt are practically una¤ected by interest rate shocks.
This assumption is a way to reconcile the model with the fact that xed-rate loans are not
one-period assets but longer term ones.
As noted above, if any, prots from nancial intermediation are rebated to the uncon-
strained consumers every period. Even if the nancial intermediary is competitive and it
does not make prots in absence of shocks, if there is a shock at a given point in time, the
fact that only the variable interest rate is a¤ected can generate non-zero prots.
1.2.3 Firms
Final Goods Producers There is a continuum of identical nal goods producers that
aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (20)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The nal good
rm chooses Yt (z) to minimize its costs, resulting in demand of intermediate good z:
Yt (z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 "
Yt: (21)
The price index is then given by:
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (z)
1 " dz
 1
" 1
: (22)
Market clearing for the nal good requires:
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Yt = Ct = C
u
t + C
c
t :
Intermediate Goods Producers The intermediate goods market is monopolistically
competitive. Intermediate goods are produced according to the production function:
Yt (z) = AtL
u
t (z)
 Lct (z)
(1 ) ; (23)
where  2 [0; 1]measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor. 10At represents
technology and it follows the following autoregressive process:
log (At) = A log (At 1) + uAt; (24)
where A is the autorregressive coe¢ cient and uAt is a normally distributed shock to tech-
nology.
Labor demand is determined by:
wut =
1
Xt

Yt
Lut
; (25)
wct =
1
Xt
(1  ) Yt
Lct
; (26)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.11
The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun
setting. An intermediate good producer sells its good at price Pt (z) ; and 1   ;2 [0; 1] ;
is the probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset
10This Cobb-Douglas production function implies that labor e¤orts of constrained and unconstrained
consumers are not perfect substitutes. This assumption can be justied by the fact that savers are the
managers of the rms and their wage is not the same as the one of the borrowers. Experimenting with
a production function in which hours are substitutes leads to very similar results (See Appendix 2). The
Cobb-Douglas specication is analytically tractable and allows for closed form solutions for the steady state
of the model.
11Symmetry across rms allows us to write the demands without the index z:
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price P t (z) solves:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

P t (z)
Pt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y t+k (z)

= 0: (27)
The aggregate price level is then given by:
Pt =
h
P "t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "
i1=(1 ")
: (28)
Using (63) and (64) ; and log-linearizing, we can obtain a standard forward-looking New
Keynesian Phillips curve which is presented in the A.
1.2.4 Monetary Policy
The model is closed with a Taylor Rule with interest rate smoothing, to describe the conduct
of monetary policy by the central bank:12
Rt = (Rt 1)
"
t
t
(1+)
R
#1 
"Rt; (29)
where 0    1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia, and  > 0 measures
the response of interest rates to current ination. R is the steady-state values of the interest
rate. "Rt is a white noise shock with zero mean and variance 2" . 

t is the ination target
that evolves according to:
log (t ) =  log
 
t 1

+ "t; (30)
where "t is normally distributed with variance 2:
12This is a realistic policy benchmark for most of the industrialized countries. A more realistic rule would
also include output but it complicates building intuition about the workings of the model. Furthermore,
estimations deliver a small response to the output gap in the last two decades (See Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2000)).
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1.3 Shock Transmission and Business Cycles
I linearize the equilibrium equations around the steady state. Details are shown in Appendix
2. For calibration, I consider the following parameter values: The discount factor, , is set
to 0:99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in the steady state. The discount factor for
borrowers, e, is set to 0:98. Lawrance (1991) estimates discount factors for poor consumers
between 0:95 and 0:98 at quarterly frequency. Results are not sensitive to di¤erent values
within this range. This value of e is low enough to endogenously divide the economy into
borrowers and savers. The weight of housing on the utility function, j, is set to 0:1 in
order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP in the steady state to be consistent with
the data. This value of j implies a ratio of approximately 1.40, in line with the Flow
of Funds data.13 I set  = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1:14 For
the loan-to-value ratio, I pick  = 0:9, consistent with the evidence that in the last years
borrowing constrained consumers borrowed on average more than 90% of the value of their
house.15 The labor income share of unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:64, following the
estimate in Iacoviello (2005). I pick a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods. This value implies a steady state markup of 1:2. The probability of
not changing prices, , is set to 0:75, implying that prices change every four quarters. For
the Taylor Rule parameters I use  = 0:8,  = 0:5: The rst value reects a realistic degree
of interest-rate smoothing.16 The second one, is consistent with the original parameter
proposed by Taylor in 1993. For , I consider two polar cases for comparison. In the rst
case, the proportion of variable-rate mortgages in the economy is 0, that is, all constrained
consumers in the economy borrow at a xed rate. In the second case, the proportion of
variable-rate mortgages is 1. Table 1 shows a summary of the parameter values.
13See Table B.100. In this model, consumption is the only component of GDP. To make the ratio compa-
rable with the data I multiply it by 0.6, which is approximately what nondurable consumption and services
account for in the GDP, according to the data in the NIPA tables.
14Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén
(2006) show that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimates could have a downward bias of 50%.
15We can identify constrained consumers with those that borrow more than 80% of their home. In the
US, among those borrowers, the average LTV ratio exceeds 90% for the period 1973-2006. See the data from
the Federal Housing Finance Board.
16See McCallum (2001).
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Parameter Values
 :99 Discount Factor for Saverse :98 Discount Factor for Borrowers
j :1 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
k :9 Loan-to-value ratio
 :64 Labor share for Savers
 0=1 Proportion of variable-rate borrowers
X 1:2 Steady-state markup
 :75 Probability of not changing prices
 :975 Ination target persistence
A :9 Technology persistence
 :8 Interest-Rate-Smoothing Parameter in Taylor Rule
 :5 Ination Parameter in Taylor Rule
Table 1: Parameter Values
1.3.1 Impulse Responses
Monetary Policy Shock Impulse responses to a one standard deviation (0.29 percent)
increase of the interest rate are presented in Figure 1.17 We can see that when the economy is
mainly composed by individuals indebted at a variable-rate, the e¤ects of monetary policy
on consumption for the borrowers are stronger than in the xed-rate case. Borrowers
housing demand, initially, also decreases more strongly after a monetary policy shock if the
predominant type of mortgages in the economy is variable rate. These ndings show that the
proportion of variable-rate mortgages matters for the monetary transmission mechanism.
17 Iacoviello (2005) estimates a Taylor Rule for the US economy and nds a 0.29 percent standard deviation
on a quarterly basis. I use this number as an empirically plausible one-standard deviation increase in the
interest rate.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock. Baseline Specication.
When the proportion of variable-rate borrowers is very high, a monetary policy shock a¤ects
more strongly those individuals who are constrained and need to borrow.
In the aggregate, output in the variable-rate economy also decreases more strongly (See
Figure 2). There is a redistribution between borrowers and savers but we can still nd
aggregate di¤erences because borrowers are more sensitive to changes in wealth (they are
more impatient and use housing wealth as collateral).
Sensitivity Analysis Di¤erences between the two scenarios are not larger because
monetary policy shocks are not very persistent and the share of borrowers in the economy
is not very large. Results are sensitive to the wage share of unconstrained individuals in the
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Figure 2: Aggregate Output Response to a Monetary Policy Shock. Baseline Specication.
economy.18 Figure 3 shows that by decreasing the size of the savers aggregate di¤erences
are amplied.
In this model income e¤ects on the labor supply decision are important. In the baseline
model preferences are separable in consumption and labor. In this case, the labor supply
decision depends on the level of consumption. Given a negative shock to the economy, labor
supply moves both in response to a substitution and an income e¤ect. On the one hand,
lower wages make consumers want to work less. On the other hand, lower consumption
generates an income e¤ect that makes consumers want to work more. Income e¤ects can
partly o¤set aggregate di¤erences. GHH preferences have the property of shutting down
the income e¤ect on the labor supply decision. In this preferences, labor and consump-
tion are non-separable. This makes labor e¤ort to be determined independently from the
intertemporal consumption-savings choice.19 There an extensive literature that has also
18This parameter represents the relative economic size of each group in the economy.
19See Appendix 2 for details on GHH preferences and derivations.
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Figure 3: Aggregate Output Response to a Monetary Policy Shock. Increasing the share of
borrowers to 60%.
used these preferences to emphasize other channels that are partially o¤set by this income
e¤ects.20 Impulse responses, in line with other studies that use GHH preferences, show how
consumption responses are stronger and aggregate di¤erences are amplied (See Figure 4).
Results for monetary policy shocks with standard preferences are very robust to al-
ternative model specications. We can introduce capital in the basic model or assume
nonseparability between housing and consumption in the utility function. The basic results
for the variables of interest are maintained.21
Ination Target Shock Instead of a shock to the interest rate, we can also consider
a more persistent monetary policy disturbance such as a shock to the ination target. Figure
5 shows the responses of the variables of interest to an increase in the ination target of 0.1
20See for example Ra¤o (2006) and references therein.
21The details of the model are presented in Appendix 2. The parameter values used for the calibration
are 0.025 for capital depreciation and 10 for capital adjustment costs. The elasticity of substitution between
non-durable consumption goods and housing of 0.5. The rest of the parameter values are the same as in the
baseline model.
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Figure 4: Aggregate Output Response to a Monetary Policy Shock. GHH Preferences.
percent, with 0.975 persistence.22
Aggregate di¤erences are amplied with this type of shock. Output increases by more
in the variable-rate case. Monetary policy responds systematically to the shock in a very
persistent way. Real interest rates fall persistently and house prices increase by less in the
variable-rate economy. Variable-rate borrowers increase by more their nondurable consump-
tion because real rates fall. Since house prices do not increase that much in the variable-rate
case, also savers can consume more nondurables.
Technology Shock A shock to technology may also have di¤erent e¤ects on the economy
depending on whether individuals are mainly borrowing at variable or xed rate. Impulse
responses to a 1 percent positive shock to technology with 0.9 persistence are showed in
Figure 6.23 We see that the economy responds more strongly after a technology shock when
22 In line with Adolfson et al. (2007) or Iacoviello and Neri (2008).
23This high value of persistence is consistent with estimates in the literature. See for instance Iacoviello
and Neri (2008).
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to an Ination Target Shock. Baseline Specication.
the majority of its borrowers have a xed-rate mortgage. A technology shock increases
output and lowers prices. As a reaction, real interest rates increase in a very persistent way.
Variable-rate borrowers consume less because increase in real rate a¤ects them negatively.
However, xed-rate consumers are better o¤ in comparison and they can consume more.
As a result, output increases by more for xed-rate consumers.
Monetary policy shocks or ination target shocks cause the real interest rate to vary
countercyclically, which is why exible-rate mortgages amplify the e¤ects those shocks.
Technology shocks, by contrast, cause the real interest rate to vary procyclically: it rises
when output rises, which is why exible-rate mortgages dampen the e¤ects of those shocks.
25
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
%
 d
ev
. s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
quarters
Output
0 5 10
0
1
2
%
 d
ev
. s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
quarters
Cons. Borrowers
0 5 10
-5
0
5
%
 d
ev
. s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
quarters
Housing Borr.
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
%
 d
ev
. s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
quarters
Cons. Savers
0 5 10
-2
0
2
%
 d
ev
. s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
quarters
Housing Savers
0 5 10
-0.1
-0.05
0
%
 d
ev
. s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
quarters
Interest Rate
0 5 10
-0.2
-0.1
0
%
 d
ev
. s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
quarters
Inflation
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
%
 d
ev
. s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
quarters
House Prices
0 5 10
0
1
2
%
 d
ev
. s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
quarters
Technology
f ixed v ariable
Figure 6: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock. Baseline Model.
1.3.2 Second Moments
Table 2 shows the standard deviations of the main variable both from the model and the
data.24 The model generates a standard deviation of GDP of 2.0127 for the variable-rate
case and 2.126 for the xed-rate economy. This is slightly smaller but close to the data
(2.26), especially for the xed-rate economy.25The volatility of consumption and housing
demand is always greater for those individuals that are constrained but smaller in the case
of variable rates. The volatility of ination and house prices is smaller in the model than
in the data while the correlation between output and house prices is greater.
24Theoretical moments calculated for technology shocks. Standard deviations from the data taken from
Davis and Heathcote (2005).
25Davis and Heathcote (2005) also nd smaller output volatility.
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Business Cycle Properties
% SD Rel. to GDP Data Model (Fixed Rates) Model (Variable Rates)
y 2.26 2.126 2.013
cu 0.931 0.904
cc 1.413 1.304
hu 2.276 0.646
hc 6.525 1.852
 0.78 0.094 0.121
q 1.37 0.552 0.911
Correlations y;q 0.65 0.960 0.993
Table 2: Business Cycle Properties.
1.4 Welfare and Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section, I compare di¤erent simple monetary policy rules based on welfare evalua-
tions, both for the whole economy and for di¤erent types of consumers, in order to provide
some normative assessment.
The individual welfare for savers and borrowers respectively is dened as follows:26
Vu;t  Et
1X
m=0
m
 
lnCut+m + j lnH
u
t+m  
 
Lut+m


!
; (31)
Vci;t  Et
1X
m=0
em lnCcit+m + j lnHcit+m    Lcit+m
!
; (32)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), I dene social welfare as a weighted sum of
individual welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Vt = (1  )Vu;t +

1  e [Vcv;t + (1  )Vcf;t] : (33)
26 I numerically compute the second order approximation of the utility function as a measure of welfare.
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Borrowers and saverswelfare are weighted by

1  e and (1  ) respectively, so that
the two groups receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream. As in
Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), I take this approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of
the three types of agents separately.27
To begin, I evaluate the welfare achieved under the ad-hoc Taylor rule used in the
baseline model. Results are presented in Table 3:
Ad-hoc Taylor Rule:  = 0:8;  = 0:5
Variable Rate Fixed Rate
Social Welfare -6.0693 -4.7097
Savers Welfare 21.5748 -822.6597
Borrowers Welfare -314.2514 175.8456
 () 0.2436 0.1999
Table 3: Welfare comparison. Ad-hoc Taylor Rule.
The economy with xed-rate mortgages achieves a higher level of welfare than the
variable-rate economy. Notice as well that there is a trade-o¤ between savers and bor-
rowerswelfare: Although a larger fraction of xed-rate borrowers raises aggregate welfare,
this comes at the cost of lower welfare for savers.
Figure (7) shows how the welfare level varies with the proportion of variable rate mort-
gages in the economy.28 This gure clearly illustrates this trade-o¤. When mortgages are
at a xed rate, savers, who own the nancial intermediary, bear all the risk associated with
interest rate changes and therefore their welfare is lower. Borrowers, are however insured
against interest-rate risk and their collateral constraint is relaxed when mortgage rates are
xed, and thus their welfare is higher. If we look at the loglinearized collateral constraint
(see equation (80) in Appendix 2), we can observe that, at a given level of ination, in real
terms, mortgage payments are lower, the lower the value of  is: As a result of this trade-o¤
27See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous consumers.
28Welfare is rescaled so that it appears in the positive axis. Additionally, borrowers and saverswelfare is
divided by 100.
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Figure 7: Welfare level for di¤erent values of . Ad-hoc Taylor rule.
between borrowers and savers, the economy achieves the maximum level of social welfare
at around the value of  = 0:3; that is, when 70 percent of the mortgages are xed rate.
Next, I study what is the monetary policy that maximizes welfare. The design of optimal
monetary policy in the presence of collateral constraints is more complicated than in the
standard sticky-price setting. In this case, there are two types of distortions, price rigidities
and credit frictions. On the one hand, the central bank should aim at lowering ination
volatility because, given sticky prices, ination distorts production decisions. On the other
hand, ination relaxes the borrowing constraints and improves the borrowerswelfare. And,
as noticed above, this ination channel is much more e¤ective when xed-rate mortgages
are predominant. The loglinearized collateral constraint shows that mortgage payments
decrease with ination but increase with the interest rate. Ination relaxes the collateral
constraint for borrowers, as long as the interest rate does not react too much to it. Therefore,
the ination channel for borrower welfare is stronger the less the central bank responds to
ination but also the lower the value of : In the limit, an economy with just xed-rate
mortgages maximizes the favorable e¤ects of ination on the collateral constraint.
29
Given a grid of possible parameters for the Taylor rule, I perform a search that maximizes
welfare, subject to determinacy requirements. For simplicity, I start by keeping the value of
 xed to 0.8 and I search over di¤erent values of , the response coe¢ cient to ination. In
this way, I can build intuition about on much the central bank should respond to ination
in di¤erent cases for the same degree of interest-rate smoothing. Results are presented in
Table 4:
Optimized Taylor Rule (Maximize Social Welfare)
Variable Rate Fixed Rate
 = 0:8;  = 0:1  = 0:8; 

 = 0:1
Social Welfare -3.0619 -0.9131
Savers Welfare -256.1426 -3398.0803
Borrowers Welfare -25.0259 1653.3866
 () 0.5611 0.5233
Optimized Taylor Rule (Maximize Savers Welfare)
Variable Rate Fixed Rate
 = 0:8;  = 3:85  = 0:8; 

 = 20
Social Welfare -10.4962 -8.8568
Savers Welfare 146.6523 -4.4361
Borrowers Welfare -598.1339 -440.6205
 () 0.0353 0.0058
Optimized Taylor Rule (Standard Sticky Price)
 = 0:8;  = 20
Social Welfare -51.0065
 () 0.0182
Table 4: Welfare Values for Optimized Taylor Rule
For the model with collateral constraints, I consider two cases: a central bank that is a
30
social welfare maximizer and a central bank that neglects the borrowerswelfare. Within
each case, mortgage contracts are either xed or variable rate. Then, I compare the results
with a model without collateral constraints. As in Monacelli (2006) and Mendicino and
Pescatori (2007), lenders prefer the central bank being aggressive against ination. How-
ever, borrowers obtain welfare gains from a monetary policy that minimizes credit market
ine¢ ciencies. The central bank aggressively ghts ination if it considers only the welfare
of those not facing credit constraints. However, economies with xed-rate contracts achieve
a higher welfare in all cases because they are less distorted by the collateral constraint. If
we compare the results with a model without collateral constraints, we clearly see that the
central bank should respond to ination less aggressively than in the standard sticky-price
model, without collateral constraints. In fact, for the model with collateral constraints the
optimal value of  corresponds to the minimum value allowed in the search while in the
absence of collateral constraints it corresponds to the maximum one.
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Optimized Taylor Rule (Maximize Social Welfare)
Variable Rate Fixed Rate
 = 0:9; = 0:35  = 0:1; 

= 0:1
Social Welfare -2.9985 20.7278
Savers Welfare -183.2848 -16768.7875
Borrowers Welfare -58.2802 9420.7829
 () 0.3490 0.9423
Optimized Taylor Rule (Maximize Savers Welfare)
Variable Rate Fixed Rate
 = 0:1; = 0:35  = 0:9; 

= 20
Social Welfare -13.0488 -8.8798
Savers Welfare 187.7239 -1.2493
Borrowers Welfare -746.3038 -443.3643
 () 0.3428 0.0077
Optimized Taylor Rule (Standard Sticky Price)
 = 0:1; = 20
Social Welfare -50.8178
 () 0.0126
Table 5: Welfare Values for Optimized Taylor Rule
Table 5 shows results for an optimized Taylor rule in which I search for both the values
of  and  so that welfare is maximized. Again in this case we can clearly see that
the optimal response to ination by the central bank is less aggressive in the presence of
collateral constraints.
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1.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have developed a New Keynesian general equilibrium model with hous-
ing and collateral constraints to study rst, how the proportion of variable-rate mortgages
in the economy can a¤ect the transmission of shocks and then, what the welfare implica-
tions of mortgage contracts are. There are unconstrained and constrained individuals that
correspond to the savers and borrowers of the economy. I explicitly introduce xed and
variable-rate mortgages, that is, constrained individuals can be of two types: those who
borrow at a variable rate and those who borrow at a xed rate.
Model responses are in line with the intuition. A monetary policy shock a¤ects more
strongly those individuals who are borrowing in economies in which the predominant type
of mortgages is at variable rate. Consumption and housing demand decrease by more after
an interest rate increase if constrained consumers are variable rate. In a general equilibrium
framework, the partial equilibrium e¤ects are maintained, but muted by a redistribution
between borrowers and savers and strong wealth e¤ects in labor supply decisions. GHH
preferences generate larger aggregate di¤erences between the two scenarios considered.
Monetary policy shocks are not persistent. More persistent shocks such as technology
or ination target shocks are able to generate much larger di¤erences in the aggregate
economy.29 Monetary policy responds to these shocks in a very persistent way causing large
aggregate di¤erences between the xed and the variable-rate economy. Ination target
shocks have more e¤ect on output in variable-rate economies. On the contrary, technology
shocks increase output by more in those economies mainly borrowing at a xed rate, due
to the procyclicality of real interest rates in this case.
From a normative perspective, I nd that the optimal interest-rate response to ination
by the Central Bank is weaker when a group of consumers need collateral to obtain loans,
29This is also consistent with Krusell and Smith (1998) or Gourinchas (2001). They study the e¤ects
of the distribution of income and wealth and the implications of precautionary savings and life cycle for
the macroeconomy in a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. Their results are not
very di¤erent from what one would obtain in a representative agent model, behaviors of di¤erent agents
practically o¤set each other in the aggregate when considering realistic parameter specication. They also
nd that permanent shocks would generate larger e¤ects on the aggregate economy.
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as compared to the standard sticky-price model. Ination relaxes the collateral constraint
and therefore reduces the distortions created by this extra friction. However, this chan-
nel is stronger the higher the proportion of xed-rate mortgages in the economy. A high
proportion of xed-rate contracts is welfare enhancing.
The model presented here can set directions for future research. The proportion of xed
and variable-rate mortgages is kept constant. A natural extension would be to endogeneize
it by modelling the mortgage choice. For instance, borrowers could be heterogeneous in
their risk aversions or market-powered banks could price mortgages charging a spread on
xed-rate mortgages depending on economic conditions. Furthermore, this model is not
able to keep track of the new xed-rate mortgages issued every period. For tractability I
assume that the nancial intermediary charges an average of the new xed interest rate
and the old interest rate for xed-rate mortgages every period. An overlapping generations
version could solve this issue. It would also be interesting to study shock transmission
and monetary policy in international versions of the model with heterogeneous mortgage
structures across countries.
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2 Housing Market Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union
Abstract30
This paper studies the implications of cross-country housing market heterogeneity for
a monetary union as well as costs and benets of being in a monetary union when there
are asymmetric shocks. I develop a two-country New Keynesian general equilibrium model
with housing and collateral constraints to explore this issue. Results show that consumption
reacts more strongly to common shocks in countries with high loan-to-value ratios (LTVs),
a high proportion of borrowers or variable-rate mortgages. As for asymmetric technology
shocks, output and house prices increase by more in the country receiving the shock if it
can conduct monetary policy independently. I also nd that country-specic housing price
shocks increase consumption not only in the country where the shock takes place, there
is an international transmission. From a normative perspective, I conclude that housing-
market homogeneization is not benecial per se, only when it is towards low LTVs or
predominantly xed-rate mortgages. As for costs and benets of monetary unions, when
there is a technology shock in one of the countries and they are symmetric, the monetary
union regime is welfare worsening. However, results are dependent on whether or not
countries are symmetric and on the source of the asymmetry.
Keywords: Housing market, collateral constraint, monetary policy, monetary union
30 I am truly thankful to Fabio Ghironi, Matteo Iacoviello and Peter Ireland for their invaluable advice.
A great part of this project has been undertaken during my stays at the Federal Reserve Board and at the
Bundesbank. I thank them for their nancial support and helpful comments. All errors are mine.
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2.1 Introduction
Costs and benets of monetary unions are a much discussed topic, especially in relation to
the Europes Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Di¤erent national characteristics such
as heterogeneous institutions, consumption patterns or nancial structures can be a source
of di¤erent transmission of common shocks in a monetary union. Also, country-specic
shocks derived from member heterogeneity can enhance the possible divergence. In this
paper, I consider how heterogeneous housing markets across members can contribute to the
transmission of shocks in a currency area. I also study the e¤ects of asymmetric shocks for
both a monetary union and a exible exchange rate regime. Finally, I use welfare analysis to
evaluate whether homogeneization is benecial in a monetary union and whether countries
with asymmetric shocks should join in a monetary union.
Countries in Europe clearly di¤er in their housing market characteristics. There is
evidence of di¤erent loan-to-value ratios (LTVs), di¤erent proportion of residential debt
relative to GDP across countries and heterogeneous mortgage contracts. Also, house price
movements do not show the same pattern in every country.31 Maclennan et al (1998)
point out the importance of such heterogeneity in a monetary union. They conclude that
there should be an e¤ort toward institutional homogeneization among European countries
to alleviate possible tensions.
LTVs in Europe range from 16% in France32 to 73% in Germany or 95% in Sweden. Eu-
ropean countries also di¤er in their proportion of borrowers. The residential debt to GDP
ratio ranges from values such as 18.7% in Italy to 98.4% in the Netherlands or 100.8% in
Denmark. In those countries with a high LTV or a high proportion of indebted consumers,
housing collateral e¤ects are stronger. Therefore, shocks that a¤ect the value of the col-
lateral constraint could potentially have amplied e¤ects on aggregate variables. This is
a clear example of the nancial accelerator mechanism, rst modeled by Bernanke et al
(1999).
31Tables in the Appendix summarize this evidence.
32According to the EMF, the average loan-to-value ratio for rst-time buyers reached a low 16% in 2004
due to house price ination and low interest rates.
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Di¤erences in mortgage contracts across countries are another important source of het-
erogeneity in Europe. In countries such as Germany or France, the majority of mortgages
are xed rate. On the contrary, the predominant type of mortgages in countries such as
the United Kingdom, Spain or Greece is variable rate. Calza et al (2007) and Rubio (2008)
show that the mortgage structure of an economy matters for the transmission of shocks,
especially for those shocks that display more persistence.
Asymmetric shocks can also pose a problem for monetary unions. For example, di¤erent
housing markets can also lead to an asymmetric evolution of house prices. Data on house
price movements for European countries in the last years show such asymmetry. There are
countries such as Spain, the United Kingdom or France that have experienced large house
price increases. However, house prices have been pretty stable and even slightly decreased in
Germany. Country-specic house price shocks can create extra divergence across monetary
union members. It is important to assess to what extent asymmetric house price movements
in a specic region can be transmitted to other areas. House prices increasing in one area
increase consumers wealth and therefore consumption. Since countries are trading also
production in other areas can increase. Furthermore, interest rates respond to ination
and creating house price movements in the whole union. Asymmetric technology shocks
can also be considered to study costs and benets of forming a monetary union. If the
shock occurs in one of the countries, the interest rate response would be di¤erent if the
economy can conduct its independent monetary policy or if it is in a monetary union regime.
Furthermore, di¤erences in the transmission of shocks when Central Banks have asymmetric
reaction functions are also an issue when countries consider joining in a monetary union
with a unique monetary policy.
There is an extensive literature discussing di¤erences in the transmission mechanisms
between European countries but little focus on the consequences of housing market hetero-
geneity from a theoretical standpoint. A microfounded general equilibrium model is needed
to understand the implications of housing market di¤erences, explore all the interrelations
that take place in the economy and do some normative analysis. Calza et al (2007) and
37
Rubio (2008) use a closed economy framework and thus cannot address housing market
heterogeneity in a monetary union. Gilchrist et al (2002) build a two-country model with a
nancial accelerator and cross-country nancial heterogeneity to explore di¤erences between
monetary regimes (monetary union vs. non monetary union). Nevertheless, their model is
silent about di¤erences in housing markets. Iacoviello and Smets (2006) develop a monetary
union model with housing market heterogeneity. However, they do not compare it with a
non monetary union framework. Also, they do not focus on the role of mortgage contract
heterogeneity. Aspachs and Rabanal (2008) have a two-country model with housing and
collateral constraints but just focus on the case of Spain and the EMU. Carré and Collard
(2003) also study the implications asymmetric technology shocks both from a positive and
a normative perspective. However, their model does not consider a housing market and
collateral constraints.
This paper presents a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model that features a housing market. There is a group of individuals in each country
that are credit constrained and need housing collateral to obtain loans. Countries trade
goods and savers in each country have access to foreign assets. Across countries, I allow
for di¤erences in LTVs, in the proportion of borrowers and in the structure of mortgage
contracts (xed vs. variable rate). I also consider idiosyncratic house price and technology
shocks. Finally, I also analyze asymmetries in the monetary policy reaction functions across
countries. Under this general setting, I compare the case in which the two countries have
independent monetary policy and di¤erent currencies with the case of a monetary union.
Results show that in a monetary union, common shocks (monetary policy and tech-
nology) have a di¤erent impact across countries when there exists housing market hetero-
geneity. In particular, consumption reacts more strongly after a shock when the LTV is
high, the proportion of borrowers is high, or when mortgages are predominantly variable
rate. Concerning asymmetric house price shocks, I nd that consumption increases in the
country where a positive house price shock takes place but also in the other country. House
price shocks are transmitted internationally. Results are robust to the monetary regime
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considered if countries are symmetric in their interest rate reaction functions. Asymmet-
ric technology shocks have di¤erent e¤ects on both economies depending on the monetary
regime considered because the interest rate response is di¤erent. Asymmetries in the mon-
etary policy response across countries also generate di¤erent transmission of shocks both
across countries and across regimes.
From a normative perspective I nd that homogeneity per se is not necessarily benecial.
For instance, total welfare is higher in a situation where LTVs are asymmetric than in a
situation where they are equal but very high because in the latter case collateral constraints
have a strong distorting e¤ect on the economy. Also, for mortgage contracts, homogeneiza-
tion is welfare improving only if it is towards xed-rate mortgages. As for benets and
costs of forming a monetary union when there is an asymmetric shock, the results depend
on whether or not countries are symmetric and on the source of asymmetry. In the case
of asymmetric house price shocks, di¤erences across regimes in terms of welfare are not
signicant. My results also show that when countries are di¤erent in their monetary pol-
icy response to ination, the country that is more aggressive against ination is especially
better o¤ under a monetary union regime.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents both the baseline model (two
countries with di¤erent currencies and independent monetary policies) and the monetary
union version. Section 3 presents the dynamics of the model. Section 4 analyzes welfare.
Section 5 concludes. Tables, steady-state relationships, the linearized model and some
sample replication les are in the Appendix.
2.2 A Two-Country Model with Housing
I develop a two-country general equilibrium model with a housing market. As a starting
point I consider the case in which each of the countries implements its own monetary policy,
under a exible exchange rate regime. In each country, the central bank sets the interest rate
to respond to domestic output and ination. I allow for mortgage and housing heterogeneity
across countries.
39
2.2.1 The Model
I consider an innite-horizon, two-country economy with a exible exchange rate regime.
Households consume, work and demand real estate. There is a nancial intermediary in
each country that provides mortgages and accepts deposits from consumers. Each country
produces one di¤erentiated good but households consume goods from both countries. Hous-
ing is a non-traded good. I assume that labor is immobile across countries. Firms follow a
standard Calvo problem. In this economy, both nal and intermediate goods are produced.
Prices are sticky in the intermediate goods sector.
The Consumers Problem There are three types of consumers in each country: uncon-
strained consumers, constrained consumers who borrow at a variable rate and constrained
consumers who borrow at a xed rate. The proportion of each type of borrower is xed
and exogenous. Consumers can be constrained or unconstrained, in the sense that con-
strained individuals need to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from the
nancial intermediary. Interest payments for both mortgages and loans next period cannot
exceed a proportion of the future value of the current house stock. In this way, the nancial
intermediary ensures that borrowers are going to be able to fulll their debt obligations
next period. As in Iacoviello (2005), I assume that constrained consumers are more impa-
tient than unconstrained ones. This assumption ensures that the borrowing constraint is
always binding, so that constrained individuals do not save and wait until they have the
funds to self-nance their consumption. This generates an economy in which households
are separated into the ones that mostly borrow and the ones that mostly save.
COUNTRY A
Unconstrained Consumers Unconstrained consumers maximize an expected life-
time utility function in three arguments: non-durable consumption, housing services and
40
labor/leisure. It is assumed that housing services are proportional to the housing stock.
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + jt lnH
u
t  
(Lut )



; (34)
Here, E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and Cut , Hut and Lut
are consumption at t, the stock of housing and hours worked respectively. jt represents the
weight of housing in the utility function. I assume that log (jt) = log(j) + uJt, where uJt
follows an autorregressive process. Shocks to jt can be interpreted as shocks to the house
price.33 1=   1 is the aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
Consumption is a bundle of domestically and foreign produced goods. The consumption
index is dened as: Cut = (C
u
At)
n (CuBt)
1 n where n is the size of Country A.
The budget constraint, in units of Country As currency, is:
PAtC
u
At + PBtC
u
Bt +QtH
u
t +RAt 1B
u
t 1 + etRBt 1Dt 1 +
 
2
etD
2
t  QtHut 1+
W ut L
u
t +B
u
t + etDt + PAtFt + PAtSt; (35)
where PAt and PBt are the prices of the goods produced in Countries A and B, respectively,
Qt is the housing price in Country A, and W ut is the wage for unconstrained consumers.
Unconstrained consumers can hold bonds. But represents domestic bonds denominated in
home currency. RAt is the nominal interest rate in Country A. Positive bond holdings mean
borrowing and negative mean savings. However, as we will see, this group will choose not to
borrow at all, they are the savers in this economy. Dt are foreign bond holdings by savers
in Country A. RBt is the nominal rate of foreign bonds, which are denominated in foreign
currency. et is the exchange rate between currency in Country A and Country B. To ensure
stationarity of net foreign assets, I introduce a small quadratic cost of deviating from zero
foreign borrowing  2 etD
2
t . They obtain interests for their savings. St and Ft are lump-sum
33A shock to jt represents a shock to the marginal utility of housing. These shocks directly a¤ect housing
demand and therefore can be interpreted as a proxy for exogenous disturbances to house prices.
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prots received from the rms and the nancial intermediary in Country A, respectively.
Dividing by PAt, we can rewrite the budget constraint in terms of good A:
CuAt+
PBt
PAt
CuBt+qtH
u
t +
RAt 1but 1
At
+
etRBt 1Dt 1
PAt
+
 
2PAt
etD
2
t  qtHut 1+wut Lut+but+
etDt
PAt
+Ft+St;
(36)
where At denotes the ination rate for the good produced in Country A, dened as
PAt=PAt 1:
Maximizing (88) subject to (90) ; we obtain the rst-order conditions for the uncon-
strained group:
CuAt
CuBt
=
nPBt
(1  n)PAt (37)
1
CuAt
= Et

RAt
At+1CuAt+1

; (38)
1   Dt
CuAt
= Et

RBtet+1
At+1CuAt+1et

; (39)
wut = (L
u
t )
 1 CuAt
n
; (40)
jt
Hut
=
n
CuAt
qt   Et n
CuAt+1
qt+1: (41)
Equation (37) equates the marginal rate of substitution between goods to the relative price.
Equation (38) is the Euler equation for consumption. Equation (91) is the rst-order con-
dition for net foreign assets. Equation (92) is the labor-supply condition. These equations
are standard. Equation (93) is the Euler equation for housing and states that at the margin
the benets from consuming housing have to be equal to the costs.
Combining (38) and (91) we obtain a non-arbitrage condition between home and foreign
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bonds:
RAt =
RBtEtet+1
(1   Dt) et : (42)
Since all consumption goods are traded and there are no barriers to trade, I assume in
this paper that the law of one price holds:
PAt = etP

At (43)
Constrained Consumers Constrained consumers are of two types: those who bor-
row at a variable rate and those who do it at a xed rate. The proportion of variable-rate
consumers is constant and exogenous and equal to A. The proportion of xed-rate con-
sumers is equal to 1  A.
Constrained consumers face a collateral constraint; the expected debt repayment next
period cannot exceed a proportion of the expectation of tomorrows value of todays stock
of housing:
Et
RcAt
At+1
bciAt  kAEtqt+1Hcit ; (44)
where i = v if the constrained consumer borrows at a variable rate and i = f if she borrows
at a xed rate. Rct is the rate at which the constrained consumer borrows and it is equal
to RAt if the constrained consumer is variable rate and equal to RAt if xed rate. kA is the
loan-to-value ratio in Country A.
Constrained consumers maximize their lifetime utility function:
max E0
1X
t=0
et lnCcit + jt lnHcit    Lcit 
!
; (45)
where Ccit =
 
CciAt
n  
CciBt
1 n
; subject to the budget constraint (in real terms):
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CciAt +
PBt
PAt
CciBt + qtH
ci
t +
RcAt 1b
ci
At 1
At
 qtHcit 1 + wcit Lcit + bcit ; (46)
and the collateral constraint.
Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, so that e < .
The rst-order conditions for these consumers are:
CciAt
CciBt
=
nPBt
(1  n)PAt (47)
n
CciAt
= eEt nRcAt
At+1CciAt+1
!
+ ciAtR
c
At; (48)
wcit =
 
Lcit
 1 CciAt
n
; (49)
jt
Hcit
=
n
CciAt
qt   eEt n
CciAt+1
qt+1   ciAtkAEtqt+1At+1: (50)
These rst-order conditions di¤er from those of the unconstrained individuals. In the
case of constrained consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint
 
cit

appears in the equations. As in Iacoviello (2005), the borrowing constraint is always binding,
so that constrained individuals borrow the maximum amount they are allowed to and their
saving is zero:34
bcit =
kAEtqt+1H
ci
t At+1
RcAt
: (51)
Therefore, consumption for constrained individuals is determined by their ow of funds:
34From the Euler equations for consumption of the unconstrained consumers, we know that RA = 1=
in steady state. If we combine this result with the Euler equation for consumption for the constrained
individual we have that ci = n

   e =CciA > 0 in steady state. This means that the borrowing constraint
holds with equality in steady state. Since we log-linearize around the steady state assuming that uncertainty
is low, we can generalize this result to o¤-steady-state dynamics.
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CciAt +
PBt
PAt
CciBt = w
ci
t L
ci
t + b
ci
t + qt
 
Hcit 1  Hcit
  RcAt 1bcit 1
At
; (52)
and the rst-order condition for housing becomes:
jt
Hcit
=
n
CciAt

qt   kAEtqt+1At+1
RcAt

  eEt n
CciAt+1
(1  kA) qt+1: (53)
The market clearing conditions for the nal good in country A is nYAt = nCAt +
(1  n)CAt+n 2 d2t and the world bond market clearing condition is ndt+(1  n) PBtPAt dt = 0;
where dt denotes the foreign bond in real terms. Variables in Country B are denoted with
a star. Everything is similar in Country B.
Within Country Aggregate Variables Given A; the fraction of variable-rate bor-
rowers in Country A, we can dene aggregates across constrained consumers as the sum
of variable-rate consumers aggregates and xed-rate consumers aggregates, so that Cct 
AC
cv
t + (1  A)Ccft ; Lct  ALcvt + (1  A)Lcft ; Hct  AHcvt + (1  A)Hcft and
bct  Abcvt + (1  A) bcft :
Therefore, economy-wide aggregates in Country A are Ct  Cut + Cct , Lt  Lut + Lct
and aggregate supply of housing is xed, so that market clearing requires Ht  Hut +Hct =
H:
Aggregates in Country B are constructed symmetrically.
The Financial Intermediary There is a nancial intermediary in each country. The
nancial intermediary accepts deposits from savers, and extends both xed and variable-rate
loans to borrowers.
COUNTRY A The prots of the nancial intermediary in Country A are dened as
follows:
Ft = ARAt 1bcvt 1 + (1  A)RAt 1bcft 1  RAt 1but 1: (54)
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For simplicity, and given that typically the time horizon of a mortgage is large, I consider
the maturity of mortgages to be innite. This assumption is not crucial for the dynamics
of the problem since we are interested in short-term business cycle uctuations.
In equilibrium, borrowing and savings have to be equal, that is bct + b
u
t = 0: Substituting
this into (54) we obtain:
Ft = (1  A)RAt 1bcft 1   (1  A)RAt 1bcft 1: (55)
Prots from nancial intermediation are rebated every period to the unconstrained
consumers in Country A.
I assume a competitive framework for the nancial intermediary. Therefore, optimality
implies that the intermediary is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or xed rate at
each point in time  . Hence, the expected discounted prots that the intermediary obtains
by lending at a xed interest rate have to be equal to the expected discounted prots the
intermediary would obtain by lending at the variable rate:
E
1X
i=+1
;iRA
OPT


bcf   bcf 1

= E
1X
i=+1
;iRAi 1

bcf   bcf 1

; (56)
where t;i = i t
CuAt
CuAt+i
is the unconstrained consumers discount factor. Since the nan-
cial intermediary is owned by the savers, their stochastic discount factor is applied to the
nancial intermediarys problem. Notice that this is not a condition on the stock of debt,
but on the new amount obtained on a given period. New debt at a given point in time is
associated with a di¤erent xed interest rate. Both the xed interest rate in period  and
the new amount of debt in period  are going to be xed for all periods. However, the xed
interest rate varies with the date the debt was issued, so that there is a new xed interest
rate associated with new debt in every period.
We can obtain the optimal value of the xed rate in period  from expression (56) :
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R
OPT
A =
E
1P
i=+1
i ;iRAi 1
E
1P
i=+1
i ;i
: (57)
Equation (57) states that, for every new debt issued at date  , there is a di¤erent xed
interest rate that has to be equal to a discounted average of future interest rates. However,
the nancial intermediary obtains interest payments every period from the whole stock of
debt, not only from the new ones. Thus, we must dene a new aggregate xed interest
rate, which is the one that the nancial intermediary e¤ectively charges every period. This
aggregate xed interest rate is composed of all past xed interest rates and past debt,
together with the current period optimal xed interest rate and new debt. Therefore, the
xed interest rate that the nancial intermediary e¤ectively charges for the stock of xed-
rate debt every period is dened as:
RAt =
RAt 1b
cf
t 1 +R
OPT
At

bcft   bcft 1

bcft
: (58)
Equation (58) states that the xed interest rate that the nancial intermediary is actually
charging today is an average between what it charged last period for the previous stock of
mortgages and what it charges this period for the new amount.
The nancial intermediary problem for Country B is symmetric.
Firms
Final Goods Producers In Country A, there is a continuum of nal goods producers
that aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function
Y k1t =
Z 1
0
Y k1t (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (59)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
The total demand of intermediate good z is given by YAt (z) =

PAt(z)
PAt
 "
YAt; and the
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price index is PAt =
hR 1
0 PAt (z)
1 " dz
i 1
" 1
:
Intermediate Goods Producers The intermediate goods market is monopolisti-
cally competitive. Intermediate goods are produced according to the following production
function:
YAt (z) = Zt (L
u
t (z))
A (Lct (z))
(1 A) ; (60)
where Zt represents technology. I assume that logZt = Z logZ1t 1 + uZt where Z is the
autorregressive coe¢ cient and uZt is a normally distributed shock to technology: measures
the relative size of each group in terms of labor.35
The rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following:36
wut =
Zt
Xt
A
YAt
Lut
; (61)
wct =
Zt
Xt
(1  A) YAt
Lct
; (62)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.
The price-setting problem for the intermediate goods producers is a standard Calvo-
Yun setting. An intermediate good producer sells good at price PAt (z) ; and 1    is the
probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price
POPTAt (z) solves:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

POPTAt (z)
PAt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y OPTAt+k (z)

= 0: (63)
The aggregate price level is given by:
35This Cobb-Douglas production function implies that labor inputs of the two groups are not perfect
substitutes. This assumption can be justied by the fact that savers are the managers of the rms and their
wage is not the same as that of the borrowers. The Cobb-Douglas specication is analytically tractable and
allows for closed form solutions for the steady state of the model.
36Symmetry across rms allows to avoid the index z:
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PAt =
h
P "At 1 + (1  )
 
POPTAt
1 "i1=(1 ")
: (64)
Using (63) and (64) and log-linearizing, we can obtain the standard forward-looking
Phillips Curve (See equation in the Appendix 3).37
The rm problem is analogous in Country B.
Monetary Policy The model is closed with a Taylor Rule with interest-rate smoothing
for interest-rate setting by each countrys central bank.38 In Country A,
RAt = (RAt 1)A


(1+A)
At RA
1 A
"AR;t; (65)
0  A  1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia. (1 + A) measures the
sensitivity of interest rates to current ination. "AR;t is a white noise shock process with
zero mean and variance 2" . In Country B, RBt is set similarly.
2.2.2 The Monetary Union Case
Now we can consider the case in which Country A and Country B form a monetary union.
The problem for consumers in this case di¤ers from the previous one in that prices are
denominated in a common currency and therefore there is no need for the use of the exchange
rate. Monetary policy is now conducted by a single central bank that reacts to ination
and output in both countries weighted by its relative size. Equations are presented in the
Appendix.
37This Phillips curve is consistent with other two-country models with nancial accelerator. See for
instance Gilchrist et al (2002) or Iacoviello and Smets (2006).
38This rule is consistent with the primary objective of the ECB being price stability. This type of rule is
also used in other monetary union models. See Iacoviello and Smets (2007) or Aspachs and Rabanal (2008)
49
2.3 Dynamics
2.3.1 Parameter Values
We can use the model to explore how shocks are transmitted across di¤erent experiments.
I linearize the equilibrium equations around the steady state. Details are shown in the
Appendix. The discount factor for savers, , is set to 0:99 so that the annual interest rate is
4% in steady state. The discount factor for borrowers, e, is set to 0:98.39 The steady-state
weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0:1 in order for the ratio of housing
wealth to GDP in steady state to be approximately 1.40.40 I set  = 2, implying a value of
the labor supply elasticity of 1:41 For the loan-to-value ratio, I pick  = 0:8 for the baseline
calibration, consistent with a weighted average of LTVs in 2004 calculated by the European
Mortgage Federation (EMF) on European countries.42However, one of the experiments I
perform consists of testing the sensitivity of results to this parameter. The labor income
share of unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:7 in both countries as a reference point.
Nonetheless, as for the LTV ratio, experiments with di¤erent values of  will be performed.43
I pick a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. This
value implies a steady-state markup of 1:2. The probability of not changing prices, , is set
to 0:75, implying that prices change on average every four quarters. For the Taylor Rule
parameters I use  = 0:8,  = 0:5: The rst value reects a realistic degree of interest-rate
smoothing.44  is consistent with the original parameters proposed by Taylor in 1993. For
the baseline model, I consider  to be equal to 1, that is, all mortgages are variable rate.45
Results when  = 0 will also be checked.
39Lawrance (1991) estimates discount factors for poor consumers between 0:95 and 0:98 at quarterly
frequency.
40This value corresponds to the US. I assume here that the ratio is similar across most industrialized
countries, given the lack of housing wealth data for European countries. See Aspachs and Rabanal (2008).
41Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén
(2006) show that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimates could have a downward bias of 50%.
42The countries that are included in the sample are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy,
Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
43This value is in the range of the estimates of Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2008) and Campbell
and Mankiw (1991) for the US, Canada, France and Sweden.
44See McCallum (2001).
45This value makes the model comparable with the standard models.
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Monetary policy shocks are represented by a one percent increase of the interest rate.
A technology shock will be a one percent positive technology with 0.9 persistence46. House
price shocks have a 0.8 persistence.47I set the size of the shock to the housing demand
parameter to 20% so that house prices increase roughly by 1 %.
Table 6 presents a summary with the parameter values:
Parameter Values in Baseline Model
 :99 Discount Factor for Saverse :98 Discount Factor for Borrowers
j :1 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
k :9 Loan-to-value ratio
 :64 Labor share for Savers
 1 Proportion of variable-rate borrowers
X 1:2 Steady-state markup
n :5 Size of Country A
 :75 Probability of not changing prices
 :8 Interest-Rate-Smoothing Parameter in Taylor Rule
 :5 Ination Parameter in Taylor Rule
 :0001 Adjustment Cost Net Foreign Assets
Table 6: Parameter Values
2.3.2 Common Shock with Housing Market Heterogeneity
LTV Asymmetry When countries in a monetary union are asymmetric, a common shock
can a¤ect them di¤erently. The rst source of asymmetry that I consider is di¤erences in
46This high persistence value for technology shocks is consistent with what is commonly used in the
literature. Smets and Wouters (2002) estimate a value of 0.822 for this parameter in Europe, Iacoviello and
Neri (2008) estimate is 0.93 for the US.
47The persistence of the house price shock is consistent with the estimates in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello
and Neri (2008).
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock in a Monetary Union.
LTVs. The loan-to-value ratio is a crucial parameter because it implies the degree of credit
accessibility for borrowers and therefore the strength of the nancial accelerator. When
LTVs are high, shocks that a¤ect the value of the collateral are amplied due to the nancial
accelerator e¤ect.
Figure 8 shows the e¤ects of a monetary policy shock in a monetary union when countries
di¤er in their LTVs. We consider Country B to be a country with a low LTV of 0.2, as
opposed to the rest of the union which has an LTV of 0.8. The size of Country B is set to
0.1. This theoretical experiment could illustrate the case of France in 2004, when LTVs for
rst-time buyers reached a low 16% due to house price ination and low interest rates.
An increase in the interest rate contracts the economy. Savers substitute intertemporally
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and prefer to save today to consume tomorrow. For borrowers, there is both a direct and
an indirect e¤ect that make their consumption decrease. First, their mortgage payments
increase and therefore they consume less. The second e¤ect comes through the collateral
constraint. Since housing prices decrease following the interest rate increase, the value of
their collateral decreases. Impatient agents are able to borrow less and hence consume less.
This collateral e¤ect, however, is stronger the higher the LTV parameter. We can see that
the e¤ects of this shock are amplied if the country has a high LTV, meaning that the
nancial accelerator is stronger there.
The experiment for a common technology shock would be analogous. Also in this case
total consumption would react more in the country that has a high LTV ratio. The interest
rate would decrease and housing prices in both countries increase. The collateral e¤ect is
greater in that country with the higher LTV and therefore its consumption would increase
by more.
Results for common monetary policy shocks are robust to the monetary regime consid-
ered if the policy reaction functions are equal across countries and also equal to the monetary
unions counterpart. However, an interesting experiment that can be performed is to see
how results vary across monetary regimes (monetary union vs. exible exchange rates and
independent monetary policies) when just one of the countries is hit by a technology shock.
Borrowers Proportion Asymmetry The proportion of borrowers is also a source of
cross-country asymmetry that matters for the transmission of shocks. This proportion is
somehow captured by 1   in the model, the labor income share of borrowers. We consider
Country B having a higher proportion of borrowers (B = 0:2) than the rest of the union
(Country A) where A = 0:7. The reasoning for this is similar to the LTV heterogeneity
case. When borrowers are very numerous, collateral constraints are a more pervasive feature
of the economy. Therefore, we should expect that in this case, common shocks also a¤ect the
variables of interest in a stronger way. Figure 9 conrms this intuition. After a monetary
policy shock, consumption reacts more strongly where the proportion of borrowers is higher.
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock in a Monetary Union.
Mortgage Contract Asymmetry Another source of heterogeneity in housing markets
is the cross-country mortgage structure heterogeneity. Let us analyze now the case in
which the structure of mortgage contracts in Country A is xed rate and variable rate
in Country B. This could be seen as Country B being for instance Spain and Country B
the rest of EMU. Consider rst an interest rate shock in a monetary union. For those
consumers with variable-rate mortgages, after a positive interest-rate shock, interest rate
payments increase by more than for the xed-rate case. Also, the value of their collateral
decreases by more. Then, the monetary policy shock hits strongly those individuals that
are constrained. We can observe in Figure 10 that consumption and housing demand for
borrowers decrease more persistently in the country in which consumers borrow at a variable
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Figure 10: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock in a Monetary Union.
rate. However, in the aggregate the e¤ects between the two countries are quantitatively
small. General equilibrium e¤ects partially o¤set aggregate di¤erences: On the one hand,
there is a redistribution between borrowers and savers. On the other hand, there are
important wealth e¤ects in the labor-supply decision, that is, variable-rate borrowers can
simply decide to work more to compensate their consumption loss.48
In Figure 11 we see that a more persistent shock, such as a technology shock deliv-
ers larger aggregate di¤erences between the two countries when the structure of mortgage
contracts di¤ers among them. In particular, we see strong di¤erences in the behaviors of
housing demand and house prices across countries. Total consumption reacts by more in
48This results are in line with Rubio (2008).
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Figure 11: Impulse Responses to a common Technology Shock. Monetary Union.
the xed-rate case due to the procyclicality of the real interest rate. Variable-rate borrow-
ers consume less because increase in real rate a¤ects them negatively. However, xed-rate
consumers are better o¤ in comparison and they can consume more. In Rubio (2008) it is
also the case that aggregate di¤erences increase with the persistence of the shock.
2.3.3 Asymmetric Technology Shock
Even if countries are symmetric, they can su¤er asymmetric shocks. Figure 12 shows impulse
responses of a technology shock that occurs only in Country B. I compare the monetary
union versus the exible exchange rates regime. When technology improves in Country B,
interest rates react little in a monetary union. However, if Country B conducts monetary
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Figure 12: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock in Country B. Monetary Union versus
Flexible Exchange Rate regime.
policy independently, the interest rate in Country B is going to decrease signicantly as
compared to the monetary union regime. As a consequence, under the exible exchange
rate regime, housing prices in Country B increase and therefore consumption increases by
more.
In Country A, when it conducts its own monetary policy, interest rates do not move
because the shock happened in Country B and ination is not changing. However, under the
monetary union regime, the common interest rates goes down and that expands Country
A economy. Furthermore, the decrease in interest rates make house prices in Country
A increase and this increases consumption and output further due to the positive wealth
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e¤ects for borrowers.
2.3.4 Idiosyncratic House Price Shock
I can also study in this framework how asymmetric house price shocks are transmitted
across countries. In a closed economy, a positive house price shock increases the value of
the collateral, and total consumption increases, mainly due to the increase in consumption
of borrowers. However, in an open economy, a country-specic house price shock can be
transmitted internationally to other countries. If that were the case, the divergence caused
by an asymmetric shock would be alleviated. Figure 13 shows the e¤ects of a house price
shock in Country A. Consumption in this country increases initially because of wealth
e¤ects. Housing demand by borrowers also increases. However, this asymmetric shock is
slightly transmitted to Country B where consumption also increases because the countries
are trading. Interest rates, especially in the union, decrease and this makes house prices in
Country B increase as well.
2.3.5 Monetary Policy Response Asymmetry
So far I have assumed that countries have the same policy parameters independently on
their monetary regime. One source of asymmetry that is worth studying is di¤erent reaction
functions across countries. It is sensible to believe that when countries have independent
monetary policies, central bankers have preferences that di¤er from the ones that a single
central banker for a monetary union would have. Figure 14 compares the monetary union
case with the exible exchange rate one for a common technology shock when countries are
symmetric in everything but in their Taylor rule. In particular, under exible exchange rates
A = 0:01 and B = 5; meaning that monetary policy in Country B is more aggressive
against ination. On the contrary, for the monetary union,  = 0:5: Given the same
technology shock, variables react di¤erently across countries and monetary regimes. When
the country is very aggressive against ination, ination does not decrease so much after
a technology shock and also the interest rate goes down by less in response. However,
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Figure 13: Impulse Responses to a House Price Shock in Country A. Monetary Union versus
Flexible Exchange Rates.
house prices increase by more and this amplies the response of output by the wealth e¤ect
channel.
2.4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, I evaluate how cross-country asymmetries a¤ect welfare for a given policy
rule. Notice that in this economy there are two types of distortions, price rigidities and
credit frictions. The individual welfare for savers and borrowers in Country A respectively
is dened as follows:49
49 I numerically compute the second order approximation of the utility function as a measure of welfare. I
consider a common technology shock.
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Figure 14: Impulse Responses to a Common Technology Shock. Monetary Union versus
Flexible Exchange Rate Regime (Country B more aggressive against ination).
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Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), I dene social welfare as a weighted sum of
individual welfare for the di¤erent type of households:
Vt = (1  )Vu;t +

1  e [Vcv;t + (1  )Vcf;t] : (68)
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Borrowers and saverswelfare are weighted by

1  e and (1  ) respectively, so that
the two groups receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream. As in
Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), I take this approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of
the three types of agents separately.50Everything is symmetric for Country B.
This analysis allows me to see if there are benets from homogeneization when countries
are heterogeneous in their housing markets and they are hit by a common technology
shock. Table 7 presents welfare comparisons under di¤erent LTVs. Country B is a small
country in a monetary union. We can observe that heterogeneity in LTVs is not necessarily
welfare worsening. High LTVs imply stronger collateral e¤ects and that enhances one of
the distortions in the economy. A symmetric economy that has high LTVs does worse than
an asymmetric economy in which one of the countries has a low LTV ratio. However, if
the economy is symmetric and both countries have low LTVs, welfare improves because the
collateral e¤ects are less important. Notice that the welfare improvements from moving to
a scenario with a lower LTV are mainly driven by the borrowers side, who are the ones that
are a¤ected by the collateral constraint. There is a trade-o¤ between savers and borrowers
welfare and savers actually lose. However, overall the economy is better o¤ when collateral
e¤ects are not so important.
kA = kB= :8 kA = kB= :2 kA = :8=kB= :2
Social Welfare A -3.486 -3.087 -3.746
Savers Welfare A -116.53 -136.66 -144.31
Borrowers Welfare A -116.05 -86.02 -115.14
Social Welfare B -3.486 -3.087 -0.817
Savers Welfare B -116.53 -136.66 117.71
Borrowers Welfare B -116.05 -86.02 -99.73
Total Welfare -3.486 -3.087 -3.453
50See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous consumers.
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Table 7: Welfare evaluation. Monetary Union. Common Technology Shock. Di¤erent
LTVs
Table 8 shows welfare comparisons for a common technology shock under di¤erent values
of , the labor income share of savers. The economy as a whole achieves a higher welfare
when the labor income share of savers is small and countries are symmetric. When  is
lower, that is, the economic size of borrowers is larger, borrowers are worse o¤ because
collateral e¤ects are more important in this case and the economy is more distorted. How-
ever, savers are better o¤. Overall, the welfare improvement of savers outweighs that of
the borrowers and the economy has higher welfare with low values of : Nevertheless, in
this case heterogeneity delivers the lowest welfare result. Country B especially, the small
heterogeneous country improves welfare signicantly by homogeneization.
A = B= :7 A = B= :2 A = :7=B= :2
Social Welfare A -3.486 -3.208 -3.233
Savers Welfare A -116.53 -80.29 -80.85
Borrowers Welfare A -116.05 -120.27 -121.24
Social Welfare B -3.486 -3.208 -9.555
Savers Welfare B -116.53 -80.29 -790.72
Borrowers Welfare B -116.05 -120.27 -82.43
Total Welfare -3.486 -3.208 -3.865
Table 8: Welfare evaluation. Monetary Union. Common Technology Shock. Di¤erent
Borrowers Proportions
In Table 9 we see that homogeneization towards xed rate mortgages is welfare improv-
ing. Countries with variable-rate mortgages are worse o¤ than countries with xed-rate
mortgage because the collateral constraint is tighter. The heterogeneity by itself is not
welfare worsening, it is the fact that in the variable-rate country the collateral constraint is
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more distorting. This suggests that countries such as Spain or the United Kingdom should
increase the proportion of xed-rate contracts.
A = B= 1 A = B= 0 A = 0=B= 1
Social Welfare A -3.486 -1.476 -1.067
Savers Welfare A -116.53 -469.86 -447.89
Borrowers Welfare A -116.05 161.08 170.57
Social Welfare B -3.486 -1.476 -6.547
Savers Welfare B -116.53 -469.86 -392.47
Borrowers Welfare B -116.05 161.08 -131.13
Total Welfare -3.486 -1.476 -1.615
Table 9: Welfare evaluation. Monetary Union. Common Technology Shock. Di¤erent
Mortgage Contracts
Welfare comparisons allow me to evaluate also costs and benets of forming a monetary
union. Table 10 shows the welfare implications of an asymmetric technology shock in
Country B when both countries are symmetric. We can observe that in this case, it is
benecial for both countries to conduct their independent monetary policies.
Symmetric Countries Monetary Union Flex. Exchange Rates
Social Welfare A -4.688 -3.608
Savers Welfare A -162.86 -196.60
Borrowers Welfare A -152.99 -82.11
Social Welfare B -3.465 -2.603
Savers Welfare B -177.31 -28.91
Borrowers Welfare B -84.59 -115.71
Total Welfare -4.076 -3.105
Table 10: Technology Shock in Country B. Welfare Comparison. Monetary Union vs.
Flexible Exchange Rates. Symmetric Countries.
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However, as noticed in Table 11, results depend on the size of the country receiving the
shock. For the country that experiments the shock, it is benecial to be in a monetary
union. However, the other country is better o¤ under a exible exchange rate regime.
These results are in line with Carré and Collard (2003). Overall, the economy is better o¤
if countries form a monetary union. When there is a positive technology shock in Country B,
production costs go down and output increases under both regimes. However, the benets
obtained by exporting to the big country are enhanced in the monetary union case because
there is not exchange rate volatility.
Country B small Monetary Union Flex. Exchange Rates
Social Welfare A -3.259 72.58
Savers Welfare A -91.25 11585.57
Borrowers Welfare A -117.33 -2163.66
Social Welfare B -2.960 -1373.23
Savers Welfare B -188.41 -140947.46
Borrowers Welfare B -53.83 1811.85
Total Welfare -3.229 -71.99
Table 11: Technology Shock in Country B. Welfare Comparison. Monetary Union vs.
Flexible Exchange Rates. Country B Small.
This conclusion are maintained under LTV asymmetry. The small country receiving
the shock has now a low LTV. I still nd that this economy is better o¤ in the monetary
union. However, we see that across regimes Country B is better o¤ with a low LTV because
collateral e¤ects are less important.
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Country B small and low LTV Monetary Union Flex. Exchange Rates
Social Welfare A -3.270 10.64
Savers Welfare A -92.04 2057.31
Borrowers Welfare A -117.50 -496.57
Social Welfare B -2.451 -259.29
Savers Welfare B -191.17 -26295.32
Borrowers Welfare B -27.00 183.00
Total Welfare -3.188 -16.35
Table 12: Technology Shock in Country B. Welfare Comparison. Monetary Union vs.
Flexible Exchange Rates. Country B Small and low LTV.
However, results are reversed if the asymmetry comes from the proportion of borrowers.
In this case, it is benecial for Country A to be in the union and welfare worsening for
Country B.
Country B small and high prop. borrowers Monetary Union Flex. Exchange Rates
Social Welfare A -3.552 -14.73
Savers Welfare A -127.59 -1935.32
Borrowers Welfare A -113.83 230.93
Social Welfare B -1.336 401.71
Savers Welfare B -72.83 40958.57
Borrowers Welfare B -30.38 -393.74
Total Welfare -3.331 26.91
Table 13: Technology Shock in Country B. Welfare Comparison. Monetary Union vs.
Flexible Exchange Rates. Country B Small and high prop. of borrowers.
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When there is asymmetry in mortgage contracts. In this case, it is not benecial to be
in a monetary union because Country B is truly worse o¤ under this regime. This is an
important result when the UK considers whether or not to enter the EMU.
Country B small and vble .rate mortgages Monetary Union Flex. Exchange Rates
Social Welfare A -3.244 -9.015
Savers Welfare A -94.12 -976.52
Borrowers Welfare A -115.16 37.50
Social Welfare B -2.978 102.59
Savers Welfare B -185.94 10581.42
Borrowers Welfare B -55.96 -160.72
Total Welfare -3.218 2.146
Table 14: Technology Shock in Country B. Welfare Comparison. Monetary Union vs.
Flexible Exchange Rates. Country B Small and vble. rate mortgages.
I can also analyze if it is benecial to form a monetary union when there are house price
shocks in just one of the countries. Table 15 shows that for an asymmetric house price
shock there is not much di¤erence in terms of welfare between being in a monetary union
or a exible exchange rate regime.
Symmetric Countries Monetary Union Flex. Exchange Rates
Social Welfare A -59.93 -60.02
Savers Welfare A 2049.08 2052.47
Borrowers Welfare A -4021.08 -4027.26
Social Welfare B -2.27 -2.27
Savers Welfare B -40.40 -40.73
Borrowers Welfare B -93.67 -93.62
Total Welfare -31.10 -31.15
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Table 15: House Price Shock in Country A. Welfare Comparison. Monetary Union vs.
Flexible Exchange Rates. Symmetric Countries.
I can also study if it is benecial for countries with di¤erent Central Bank preferences
to form a monetary union with a unique Central Bank. Table 16 shows welfare comparisons
for the two monetary regimes when countries are asymmetric in their interest rate response
to ination. We see that the country that ghts ination more aggressively (Country B)
gains from joining a monetary union in which the level of aggressiveness is intermediate.
The Country with a small ination coe¢ cient in the Taylor Rule also gains slightly. Overall,
the economy benets from joining in a monetary union.
Asymmetric TR Monetary Union Flex. Exchange Rates
Social Welfare A -3.486 -3.677
Savers Welfare A -116.53 -161.23
Borrowers Welfare A -116.05 -103.27
Social Welfare B -3.486 -4.614
Savers Welfare B -116.53 31.09
Borrowers Welfare B -116.05 -246.26
Total Welfare -3.486 -4.146
Table 16: Welfare Comparisons. Asymmetric Policy Responses, Common Technology
Shock. Monetary Union vs. Flexible Exchange Rates
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper explores rst how cross-country housing market heterogeneity a¤ects the trans-
mission of shocks in a monetary union. Since there is evidence of such heterogeneity across
countries in Europe, it is relevant to evaluate to what extent this is important. Then, I also
study the e¤ects of asymmetric shocks and asymmetric monetary policy responses across
members. Results are presented both from a positive and a normative perspective.
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For this purpose, I build a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model that features a housing market. A group of individuals in each country are credit
constrained and need housing collateral to obtain loans. I consider two monetary regimes:
the two countries conducting its own monetary policy under a exible exchange rate system
and a monetary union between the two countries.
I nd that after a common monetary policy or technology shock, variables respond
more strongly if the country has a high LTV, a high proportion of borrowers or mainly
variable rate mortgages. As for country-specic shocks, I nd that the e¤ects of a house
price shock in one country are transmitted internationally to the other country and that
the e¤ects of asymmetric technology shocks depend on the monetary regime. I also study
how asymmetries in the monetary policy reaction functions lead to di¤erent transmission
of common shocks across monetary regimes.
From a normative perspective, I nd that housing market homogeneization per se is
not necessarily benecial. Since low LTVs imply that collateral e¤ects are less impor-
tant and therefore the collateral constraint less distorting, homogeneization towards high
LTVs decreases welfare. However, in the case of the borrowers proportion, homogeneiza-
tion would increase welfare. As for mortgage contracts, result suggest that countries with
predominantly variable-rate contracts should move towards xed-rate contracts. Fixed-rate
mortgages reduce the distorting e¤ects of the collateral constraint. In terms of analyzing
costs and benets of forming a monetary union, I nd that, when countries are symmetric
and there is an asymmetric technology shock, a monetary union regime decreases welfare.
However, this result may change once asymmetries are introduced. When the country that
receives the shock is small I nd that, as in Carré and Collard (2003), this country is better
o¤ under a monetary union. Nevertheless, the other country is better o¤ under a exible
exchange rates regime. This result is still maintained if the small country has a low LTV.
However, if the small country has a high proportion of borrowers or variable-rate mortgages,
as opposed to the rest of countries in the union, the monetary union regime is welfare wors-
ening. On the contrary, for an asymmetric house price shock, the monetary regime does
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not make any signicant di¤erence for welfare. When countries are asymmetric in their
aggressiveness towards ination, I nd that overall a monetary union with an intermediate
response to ination is benecial.
For future research, it would be interesting to study what is the optimal monetary policy
under the di¤erent sources of asymmetry for the monetary union as a whole and for the
two countries separately.
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Figure 15: Proportion of Variable-Rate Mortgages in the US and UK. Source: Federal
Housing Finance Board and Council of Mortgage Lenders
Loan-to-value ratios in European Countries (2006)
Germany 73%
France 16%
Sweden up to 95%
Denmark 50%
Spain 66.5%
Italy 60% and higher
United Kingdom 78%
Source: European Mortgage Federation (Factsheets)
Table 1751
51Average LTV for all buyers. For France, rst-time buyers in 2004.
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Predominant Type of Mortgage Interest Rate
Australia Vble (mostly) Italy Mixed (72%)
Austria Fixed (75%) Japan Mixed /Vble (64%)
France Fixed (86%) Spain Vble (75%)
Germany Fixed (mostly) United Kingdom Vble (72%)
Greece Vble (80%) United States Fixed (85%)
Source: ECB (2003), Debelle (2004), Calza et al. (2006)
Table 18
Residential Debt to GDP Ratio (2006)
Belgium 36.3% Italy 18.7%
Denmark 100.8% Netherlands 98.4%
Germany 51.3% Austria 23.5%
Greece 29.3% United Kingdom 83.1%
Spain 58.6% Sweden 56.7%
France 32.2% EU 27 49.0%
Source: European Mortgage Federation
Table 19
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House Price % Change in European Countries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Belgium 5.1 7.1 7.2 5.5 16.3 12.1
Denmark 7.9 5.3 5.2 11.7 17.0 16.2
Germany 0.0 -1.6 -0.8 -0.8 -1.7 -0.9
Greece 14.6 13.0 5.7 5.2 13.1 9.0
Spain 9.9 15.7 17.6 17.4 13.9 10.4
France 8.1 9.0 11.5 17.6 14.7 9.9
Ireland 8.0 3.6 14.1 11.2 10.6 13.6
Italy 7.9 10.0 10.7 n/a n/a n/a
Latvia n/a 14.0 17.5 4.9 48.6 n/a
Hungary 8.6 -1.1 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Poland 10.0 -4.2 -6.9 n/a n/a n/a
Sweden 8.0 6.3 6.6 9.6 9.6 11.4
UK 8.4 17.0 15.7 11.8 5.5 6.3
Source: European Mortgage Federation
Table 20
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Appendix 2: Model Derivations and Alternative Specications
for "Fixed and Variable-Rate Mortgages, Business Cycles and
Monetary Policy"
Steady-State Relationships
Using (3) in the steady state we obtain R = 1=. From (57) and (58) we have that
R

= R = R = 1=.
From the rst order conditions for housing we can obtain the steady-state consumption-
to-housing ratio for both constrained and unconstrained consumers:
Cu
qHu
=
1
j
(1  ) ; (69)
Cc
qHc
=
1
j

1  e   k    e = q
j
; (70)
where  

1  e   k    e. From (52) and (62)we obtain the constrained and
unconstrained consumption-to-output ratio in the steady state:
Cc
Y
=
1  
X


+ jk (1  )

; (71)
Cu
Y
= 1  C
c
Y
; (72)
where X = "= ("  1)
The housing-to-output ratio for constrained and unconstrained consumers:
qHc
Y
=
(1  ) j
X

1
 + jk (1  )

; (73)
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qHu
Y
=
Xj ( + jk (1  ))  j (1  ) 
X ( + jk (1  )) (1  ) : (74)
Log-Linearized Model
The model can be reduced to the following linearized system in which all lower-case variables
with a hat denote percent changes from the steady state and steady-state levels are denoted
by dropping the time index:
Financial intermediary
br = (1  ) E
1X
i=+1
i bri 1; (75)
brt = brt 1 ) brt = br = 0: (76)
Equation (75) is the log-linearized xed interest rate in each period  . Using this result we
can obtain the log-linearized aggregate xed interest rate, which is zero in deviations from
the steady state (equation (76)), given the initial condition of being at the steady state in
the absence of shocks.
Aggregate Demand
byt = Cu
Y
bcut + CcY bcct ; (77)
bcut = Etbcut+1   (brt   Etbt+1) ; (78)
bcct = + jk (1  )

(byt   bxt)  j

bhct   bhct 1
+
kj


bbct  bbct 1  kj (brt 1   bt) ; (79)
77
bbct = Etbqt+1 + bhct   (brt   Etbt+1) : (80)
Equation (77) is the log-linearized goods market clearing condition. Equation (172) is the
Euler equation for unconstrained consumption. Equation (79) is the budget constraint for
constrained individuals, which determines constrained consumption. Equation (80) is the
log-linearized collateral constraint.
Housing Equations
Hu
Y
bhut + HcY bhct = 0; (81)
bhut = 11   (bcut   bqt)  1  Et  bcut+1   bqt+1 ; (82)
bhct = 1  k bcct   1bqt   k (brt   Etbt+1) + ebqt+1   e (1  k) Etbcct+1: (83)
Equation (81) is the log-linearized market clearing condition for housing. Equation (82) is
the housing margin for unconstrained consumers. Equation (181) is the analogous expres-
sion for constrained consumers.
Aggregate Supply
byt =   1
   1 (bcut + (1  )bcct + bxt) ; (84)
bt = Etbt+1   ekbxt + ut: (85)
Equation (183) is the production function combined with labor market clearing. Equation
(85) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve that relates ination positively to future ination
and negatively to the markup ( ek  (1  ) (1  ) =). ut is a normally distributed
cost-push shock.
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brt = brt 1+ (1  ) [(1 + ) (bt   bt ) + ybyt] + et: (86)
Alternative Model Specications
The Model with GHH Preferences
Under GHH preferences, savers maximize:
E0
1X
t=0
t

ln

Cut  
(Lut )


+ j lnHut

; (87)
The rst-order conditions are:
1
Cut   (L
u
t )

 = Et
2664 Rt
t+1

Cut+1   (
Lut+1)



3775 ; (88)
wut = (L
u
t )
 1 ; (89)
j
Hut
=
1
Cut   (L
u
t )

 qt   Et
1
Cut+1   (
Lut+1)

 qt+1: (90)
Note that consumption no longer appears in the labor-supply decision (equation (89)).
Similarly, we can obtain the rst-order conditions for borrowers:
1
Ccit   (
Lcit )


= eEt
2664 Rcit
t+1

Ccit+1   (
Lcit+1)



3775+ cit Rcit ; (91)
wcit =
 
Lcit
 1
; (92)
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jHcit
=
1
Ccit   (
Lcit )


qt   eEt 1
Ccit+1   (
Lcit+1)


qt+1   cit kEtqt+1t+1: (93)
The Model with Capital
We can add capital to the model so that unconstrained consumers have more saving choices.
Since borrowers would not hold capital, the only part of the model that changes is the one
of the unconstrained consumers:
Unconstrained consumers maximize their expected lifetime utility function:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + j lnH
u
t  
(Lut )



; (94)
subject to the budget constraint which includes capital:
Cut + qtH
u
t +Kt   (1  )Kt 1 +

2

Kt  Kt 1
Kt 1
2
+
Rt 1but 1
t
 qtHut 1 (95)
+ztKt 1 + wut L
u
t + b
u
t + F
v
t + S
v
t ;
So, in this case, savers can buy houses or sell them at the current price qt and hold
bonds. They can also hold capital Kt, whose price is normalized to unity, which they rent
to rms at rental price zt.  is the depreciation rate of capital. Consumers also have to pay
quadratic adjustment costs for capital.
Maximizing (94) subject to (95) ; we obtain the rst-order conditions:
1
Cut
= Et

Rt
t+1Cut+1

; (96)
wut = (L
u
t )
 1Cut ; (97)
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jHut
=
1
Cut
qt   Et 1
Cut+1
qt+1: (98)
1
Cut

1 + 

Kt  Kt 1
Kt 1

= Et
1
Cut+1

zt + (1  ) + Kt+1
K2t

Kt+1  Kt
Kt

; (99)
Now, we have a fourth rst order condition, equation (99), which is the rst order condition
with respect to capital.
Unconstrained individuals are not going to hold capital in equilibrium so their problem
remains unchanged.
Intermediate goods are going to be produced according to the following production
function:
Yt = (L
u
t )
 (Lct)
(1 )K1 t 1 ; (100)
where  measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor and  is the labor share.
Firms choose employment and capital to
minwut L
u
t + w
c
tL
c
t + ztKt 1;
subject to the production function, demand and the constraint imposed by nominal rigidity.
The rst-order conditions for labor and capital demand are the following:
wut =
1
Xt

Yt
Lut
; (101)
wct =
1
Xt
(1  ) Yt
Lct
; (102)
zt =
1
Xt
(1  ) Yt
Kt 1
; (103)
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Non Separability between Housing and Non-Durable Consumption in the Utility
Function
Unconstrained consumers consume an index of non-durable goods and housing dened as:
Iut =
h
(1  ) 1 (Cut )
 1
 + 
1
 (Hut )
 1

i 
 1
; (104)
where  is the share of housing in the composite consumption index and  is the elasticity
of substitution between non-durable consumption goods and housing.
Unconstrained consumers maximize an expected lifetime utility function with two
arguments; the consumption index and labor/leisure.
max E0
1X
t=0
t

ln Iut  
(Lut )



; (105)
Subject to the budget constraint:
Cut + qtH
u
t +
Rt 1but 1
t
 qtHut 1 + wut Lut + but + F vt + Svt ; (106)
Maximizing (105) subject to (106) ; we obtain the rst-order conditions:
(Cut )
 1

(1  ) 1 (Cut )
 1
 + 
1
 (Hut )
 1

= Et
24 Rt
t+1
0@  Cut+1 1
(1  ) 1  Cut+1 1 +  1  Hut+1 1
1A35 ;
(107)
wut
(1  ) 1 (Cut )
 1

(1  ) 1 (Cut )
 1
 + 
1
 (Hut )
 1

= (Lut )
 1 ; (108)

1
 (Hut )
 1

(1  ) 1 (Cut )
 1
 + 
1
 (Hut )
 1

=
(1  ) 1 (Cut )
 1

(1  ) 1 (Cut )
 1
 + 
1
 (Hut )
 1

qt (109)
 Et
(1  ) 1  Cut+1 1
(1  ) 1  Cut+1 1 +  1  Hut+1 1 qt+1
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In the same way, we have the problem of the constrained consumers.
They also consume a consumption index that aggregates non-durable goods and housing:
Icit =

(1  ) 1  Ccit  1 +  1  Hci 1   1 ; (110)
Constrained consumers maximize the lifetime utility function subject to the budget
constraint and the collateral constraint:
max E0
1X
t=0
et ln Icit    Lcit 
!
; (111)
subject to:
Ccit + qtH
ci
t +
Rct 1bcit 1
t
 qtHcit 1 + wcit Lcit + bcit ; (112)
Et
Rct
t+1
bcit  kEtqt+1Hcit : (113)
The rst-order conditions for the consumers are:
(1  ) 1  Ccit  1
(1  ) 1  Ccit  1 +  1  Hcit  1 = eEt
24 Rct
t+1
0@ (1  ) 1  Ccit+1 1
(1  ) 1  Ccit+1 1 +  1  Hcit+1 1
1A35
(114)
+cit R
c
t ;
wcit
(1  ) 1  Ccit  1
(1  ) 1  Ccit  1 +  1  Hcit  1 =
 
Lcit
 1
; (115)
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
1

 
Hcit
 1

(1  ) 1  Ccit  1 +  1  Hcit  1 =
(1  ) 1  Ccit  1
(1  ) 1  Ccit  1 +  1  Hcit  1 qt (116)
 eEt (1  ) 1  Ccit+1 1
(1  ) 1  Ccit+1 1 +  1  Hcit+1 1 qt+1   cit kEtqt+1t+1:
These rst-order conditions di¤er from those of the unconstrained individuals. In
the case of constrained consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint 
cit

appears in the equations. From the Euler equations for consumption of the un-
constrained consumers, we know that R = 1= in steady state. If we combine this re-
sult with the Euler equation for consumption for the constrained individual we have that
ci =
( e)(1 ) 1 (Cci) 1
(1 )
1
 (Cci)
 1
 +
1
 (Hci)
 1

> 0 in steady state, given that e < . This means that
the borrowing constraint holds with equality in steady state. As in Iacoviello (2005), since
we log-linearize around the steady state and assuming that uncertainty is low, we can gen-
eralize this steady-state result. Then, the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that
constrained individuals are going to borrow the maximum amount they are allowed to and
their savings are going to be zero:
bcit =
kEtqt+1H
ci
t t+1
Rct
: (117)
Therefore, consumption for constrained individuals is determined by their ow of funds:
Ccit = w
ci
t L
ci
t + b
ci
t + qt
 
Hcit 1  Hcit
  Rct 1bcit 1
t
; (118)
And the rst-order condition for housing becomes:
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
1

 
Hcit
 1

(1  ) 1  Ccit  1 +  1  Hcit  1 =
(1  ) 1  Ccit  1
(1  ) 1  Ccit  1 +  1  Hcit  1

qt   kEtqt+1t+1
Rct

(119)
 eEt (1  ) 1  Ccit+1 1
(1  ) 1  Ccit+1 1 +  1  Hcit+1 1 (1  k) qt+1:
The problem of the nancial intermediary, the rms and the monetary policy is identical
to the baseline model.
A Two-Sector Model
We can relax the assumption that the housing supply is xed and consider a two-sector
model in which consumers can supply labor to the housing sector and the consumption
sector.
Unconstrained consumers:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + j lnH
u
t  

(Luct)
1 
+ (Luht)
1  1+1 
; (120)
subject to the budget constraint:
Cut + qtH
u
t +
Rt 1but 1
t
 qt (1  )Hut 1 + wuctLuct + wuhtLuht + but + F vt + Svt ; (121)
Maximizing (120) subject to (121) ; we obtain the rst-order conditions:
1
Cut
= Et

Rt
t+1Cut+1

; (122)
wuct = (1 + )

(Luct)
1 
+ (Luht)
1  +1 
(Luct)
 
Cut ; (123)
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wuht = (1 + )

(Luct)
1 
+ (Luht)
1  +1 
(Luht)
 
Cut ; (124)
j
Hut
=
1
Cut
qt   Et 1
Cut+1
(1  ) qt+1: (125)
Equations (122) is the consumption Euler equation. Equations (123) and (124) are the
labor-supply condition for the consumption and the housing sector, respectively. Equation
(125) is the Euler equation for housing and states that the benets from consuming housing
have to be equal to the costs.
Constrained consumers maximize the lifetime utility function subject to the budget
constraint and the collateral constraint:
max E0
1X
t=0
et lnCcit + j lnHcit    Lcict1  +  Lciht1  1+1 
!
; (126)
subject to:
Ccit + qtH
ci
t +
Rct 1bcit 1
t
 qt (1  )Hcit 1 + wcictLcict + wcihtLciht + bcit ; (127)
Et
Rct
t+1
bcit  kEtqt+1Hcit : (128)
The rst-order conditions for the consumers are:
1
Ccit
= eEt Rct
t+1Ccit+1

+ cit R
c
t ; (129)
wcict = (1 + )
 
Lcict
1 
+
 
Lciht
1  +1   
Lcict
 
Ccit ; (130)
wciht = (1 + )
 
Lcict
1 
+
 
Lciht
1  +1   
Lciht
 
Ccit ; (131)
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jHcit
=
1
Ccit
qt   eEt 1
Ccit+1
(1  ) qt+1   cit kEtqt+1t+1: (132)
Using the fact that the collateral constraint is binding, consumption for constrained
individuals is determined by their ow of funds:
Ccit = w
ci
ctL
ci
ct + w
ci
htL
ci
ht + b
ci
t + qt
 
(1  )Hcit 1  Hcit
  Rct 1bcit 1
t
; (133)
And the rst-order condition for housing becomes:
j
Hcit
=
1
Ccit

qt   kEtqt+1t+1
Rct

  eEt 1
Ccit+1
(1  k) (1  ) qt+1 (134)
The problem for the nancial intermediary and the nal good producer is identical to
the baseline model. The problem for the intermediate good producer is slightly changed.
Intermediate goods are produced according to the following production function:
Yct = (L
u
ct)
 (Lcct)
(1 ) ; (135)
where  measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor.
Analogously, the production function for the housing sector is the following:
Yht = (L
u
ht)
 (Lcht)
(1 ) ; (136)
Firms choose employment to
minwuctL
u
ct + w
c
ctL
c
ct + w
u
htL
u
ht + w
c
htL
c
ht;
subject to the production function, demand and the constraint imposed by nominal rigidity.
The rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following:
wuct =
1
Xt

Yct
Luct
; (137)
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wcct =
1
Xt
(1  ) Yct
Lcct
; (138)
wuht = qt
Yht
Luht
; (139)
wcht = qt (1  )
Yht
Lcht
; (140)
Production function in which labor for savers and labor for borrowers are sub-
stitutes
The consumers and nancial intermediarys problem remains unchanged. However, the
intermediate goods rms production function turns into the following one:
Yt = !L
u
t + (1  !)
h
Lcvt + (1  )Lcft
i
= !Lut + (1  !)Lct ; (141)
where ! is the size of the unconstrained group.
Firms choose employment to
min!wut L
u
t + (1  !)wctLct ;
subject to the production function, demand and the constraint imposed by nominal rigidity.
The rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following:
wut = w
c
t =
1
Xt
: (142)
We see that in this case, the wage paid to each group is the same.
Aggregate variables are dened as follows:
Ct  !Cut + (1  !)Cct : (143)
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Lt  !Lut + (1  !)Lct : (144)
Ht  !Hut + (1  !)Hct : (145)
Appendix 3: Model Derivations and Codes for " Housing Mar-
ket Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union"
The Monetary Union Case
Unconstrained consumers in Country A:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + jt lnH
u
t  
(Lut )



; (146)
subject to:
CuAt+
PBt
PAt
CuBt+qtH
u
t +
RAt 1but 1
At
+
Rt 1dt 1
At
+
 
2
d2t  qtHut 1+wut Lut+but+dt+Ft+St; (147)
where Rt is an international interest rate. The non-arbitrage condition between home and
foreign bonds implies now that
RAt =
Rt
(1   dt) ; (148)
The equations for consumers in Country B are symmetric. The problem for the rms
and the nancial intermediary in each country is identical to the non-monetary union case.
The Taylor Rule becomes:
Rt = (Rt 1)
0@h(At)n (Bt)(1 n)i(1+) "YAt=YAt 1
YA
nYBt=YBt 1
YB
1 n#y
R
1A1  "R;t;
(149)
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Steady-State Relationships
Relative prices in the steady state are derived from equations (37), (47)and their counter-
parts for Country B:
n
1  n
PB
PA
=
CuA
CuB
=
CciA
CciB
=
CuA
CuB
=
CciA
CciB
(150)
Interest rates:
RA = R = RB = R = R

= 1= (151)
We can nd the consumption to housing ratio for savers and borrowers in Country A by
using the rst order conditions for housing:
CuA
qHu
=
n
j
(1  ) (152)
CcA
qHc
=
n
j
h
1  e  kA    ei = n
j
 (153)
Similarly, for Country B:
CuB
qHu
=
(1  n)
j
(1  ) (154)
CcB
qHc
=
(1  n)
j
h
1  e  kB    ei = (1  n)
j
 (155)
Borrowing in the steady state:
bci = kAqH
ci: (156)
bu + bc = 0
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bci = kBqHci: (157)
bu + bc = 0
From the problem of the rm we have that in the steady state:
wu =
1
X

YA
Lu
; (158)
wc =
1
X
(1  ) YA
Lc
; (159)
wu =
1
X

YB
Lu
; (160)
wc =
1
X
(1  ) YB
Lc
; (161)
where X = X =
"  1
"
:
Combining the steady-state budget constraint for the unconstrained consumers in Coun-
try A with(152) and (158) we obtain:
CuA
YA
=
n ( +X   1)
X (1  jkA) (162)
Similarly, for constrained consumers:
CcA
YA
=
1  
X
n
 + jkA (1  ) (163)
The market clearing condition for the good produced in Country A implies:
CA
YA
=
n
1  n

1  C
u
A
YA
  C
c
A
YA

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Using (152) and (162) we can nd the housing to output ratio for the savers in Country
A:
Hu
YA
=
j ( +X   1)
Xq (1  jkA) (1  ) (164)
Analogously, using (153) and (163) we can nd the housing to output ratio for the
constrained consumers in Country A:
Hc
YA
=
(1  ) j
Xq
n
 + jkA (1  ) (165)
Similarly, for Country B:
CuB
YB
=
(1  n) ( +X   1)
X (1  jkB) (166)
CcB
YB
=
1  
X
 (1  n)
 + jkB (1  ) (167)
Hu
YB
=
j ( +X   1)
Xq (1  jkB) (1  ) (168)
Hc
YB
=
(1  ) j
Xq
(1  n)
 + jkB (1  ) (169)
Log-linearized Equations
Variables in deviations from the steady state are expressed in lower-case and with a hat.
Interest Rates
r^At = r^Bt + Et (e^t+1   e^t) +  ; (170)
brAt = brBt = 0: (171)
92
Aggregate Demand
bcuAt = EtbcuAt+1   (brAt   EtbAt+1) ; (172)
bcuBt = EtbcuBt+1   (brBt   EtbBt+1) ; (173)
c^cAt =

 + jkA (1  )


(y^At + bzt   x^t)  j


h^ct   h^ct 1

+
kAj


b^ct   b^ct 1

  kAj (Ar^At 1   ^At) ; (174)
b^ct = Etq^t+1 + h^
c
t   (Ar^At   Et^At+1) ; (175)
c^cBt =

 + jkB (1  )


(y^Bt + bzt   x^t)  j h^ct   h^ct 1
+
kBj



b^ct   b^ct 1

  kBj (B r^Bt 1   ^Bt) ; (176)
b^ct = Etq^

t+1 + h^
c
t   (B r^Bt   Et^Bt+1) ; (177)
c^At   c^Bt = c^At   c^Bt (178)
Housing Equations
bhut = 11   (bcuAt   bqt)  1  Et  bcuAt+1   bqt+1 ; (179)
bhut = 11   (bcuBt   bqt )  1  Et  bcuBt+1   bqt+1 ; (180)
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h^ct =
1  kA

c^ct  
1

q^t   kA

(Ar^At   Et^At+1) +
e

Etq^t+1  
e (1  kA)

Etc^
c
t+1: (181)
h^ct =
1  kB

c^ct  
1

q^t  
kB

(B r^Bt   Et^Bt+1) +
e

Etq^

t+1  
e (1  kB)

Etc^
c
t+1: (182)
Aggregate Supply
y^At =
 + 1
   1bzt   1   1 (c^uAt + (1  ) c^cAt + x^t) ; (183)
y^At =

CuA
YA
+
CcA
YA

c^At +

1  C
u
A
YA
  C
c
A
YA

c^At (184)
y^Bt =
 + 1
   1bzt   1   1 (c^uBt + (1  ) c^cBt + x^t ) ; (185)
y^Bt =

CuB
YB
+
CcB
YB

c^Bt +

1  C
u
B
YB
  C
c
B
YB

c^Bt; (186)
^At = ^At+1   ekx^t + uAt; (187)
^Bt = ^

Bt+1   ekx^t + uBt; (188)
where ek = (1 )(1 ) and uAt and uBt are cost-push shocks.
Monetary Policy
r^At = Ar^At 1+ (1  A) [(1 + A) ^At + Ayy^At] + AR;t; (189)
r^Bt = B r^Bt 1+ (1  B) [(1 + B) ^Bt + Byy^Bt] + BR;t; (190)
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Notice that under the monetary union regime (189) and (190) become:
r^t = r^t 1+ (1  ) f(1 + ) [n^At + (1  n) ^Bt] + y [nAty^At + (1  n) y^Bt]g+ R;t (191)
Matlab Code for Welfare Analysis (Monetary Union Case)
These matlab les replicate the results on pages 61, 62 and 63 of this dissertation. It requires
the use of Dynare (http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/~michel/dynare/). The "mod" le needs
to be saved with the extension "mod" as "name.mod" and it is the main le that has to
be run. It also requires the use of the auxiliary "m" le containing the steady states of the
model, which has to be saved with the name "name_steadystate.m". The output of the le
reports the welfare calculations on the rst columns of Tables 7, 8 and 9 of this dissertation
for the case of a monetary union. The results of the rest of the columns can be obtained by
modifying the value of the parameters accordingly. Files for the exible exchange rate case
are available upon request.
Mod File
//%                   
//% Declare endogenous and exogenous variab les
//%                   
var
b bf bu c ca ca1 ca1v ca1f c1 cb cb1 cb1v cb1f c1v c1f c1v_ star c1f_ star
dpa h h1 h1v h1f lm f lmv nc nc1 nc1f ncc q uca uca1 uca1f ucb ucb1 ucb1f
X Y b_star bf_ star c_ star ca_ star ca1_ star ca1v_ star ca1f_ star c1_ star
cb_ star cb1_ star cb1v_ star cb1f_ star dpb h_star h1_ star h1v_ star h1f_ star
lm f_ star lmv_star nc_ star nc1_ star nc1f_ star ncc_ star q_ star uca_ star
uca1_ star uca1f_ star ucb_ star ucb1_ star ucb1f_ star uu welfu ucv welfcv
ucf welfcf welf uu_ star welfu_ star ucv_ star welfcv_ star ucf_ star welfcf_ star
welf_ star welfun ion X_star Y_star d r ra rb rbar
data_CCA data_CCB data_DPE data_QQA data_QQB data_RRE GDPA GDPB
a_a a_c a_ j1 a_ j2 a_z1 a_z2 ;
//% shocks
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varexo eps_a eps_ j1 eps_ j2 eps_e eps_c eps_e eps_a1 eps_ j2 eps_p eps_z1 eps_z2 ;
//%                   
//% Declare model param eters
//%                   
param eters BETA BETA1 JEI MUC MUH DKC DKH DH ETA EC EC_STAR FIK ;
param eters FIK_STAR FIH M M_STAR GAMMA GAMMA_STAR NU NA HB ;
param eters TETA TAYLOR_R TAYLOR_P X_SS LAGP RHO_AA RHO_AC ;
param eters RHO_AJ1 RHO_AJ2 RHO_AK1 RHO_AK2 RHO_AZ1 RHO_AZ2 ;
param eters CC_SS CC_SS_star IK_SS IK_SS_star QQ_SS QQ_SS_star ;
param eters ALPHA ALPHA_STAR;
X_SS = 1.2 ;
BETA = 0.99 ;
BETA1 = 0.98 ;
JEI=0.1 ;
MUC=0 ;
MUH=0 ;
DKC=0 ;
DKH=0 ;
DH=0 ;
ETA=1 ;
NU=0 ;
LAGP = 0 ;
TETA = 0.75 ;
TAYLOR_R = 0.8 ;
TAYLOR_P = 0.5 ;
F IH=0 ;
FIK=0 ;
FIK_STAR=0 ;
EC=0;
EC_STAR=0;
GAMMA=0.7 ;
GAMMA_STAR=0.7;
M=0.8;
M_STAR=0.8 ;
NA = .9 ;
HB = 0 ;
ALPHA=1;
ALPHA_STAR=1;
//%Shocks param eters
RHO_AA = 0.9 ;
RHO_AC = 0.8 ;
RHO_AJ1 = 0.8 ;
RHO_AJ2 = 0.8 ;
RHO_AK1 = 0.8 ;
RHO_AK2 = 0.8 ;
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RHO_AZ1 = 0.8 ;
RHO_AZ2 = 0.8 ;
STDERR_AA = 0.01 ;
STDERR_AC = 0.01 ;
STDERR_AP = 0.01 ;
STDERR_AE = 0.01 ;
STDERR_AJ1 = 0.2 ;
STDERR_AJ2 = 0.2 ;
STDERR_AK1 = 0.05 ;
STDERR_AK2 = 0.05 ;
STDERR_AZ1 = 0.03 ;
STDERR_AZ2 = 0.03 ;
//%                   
//% Model equations
//%                   
model ;
//% Welfare
uu=c+JEI*h-(exp(nc)^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA);
welfu=uu+BETA*welfu(+1);
ucv=c1v+JEI*h1v-(exp(nc1)^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA);
welfcv=ucv+BETA1*welfcv(+1);
ucf= c1f+JEI*h1f-(exp(nc1f )^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA);
welfcf=ucf+BETA1*welfcf(+1);
welf= (1-BETA)*welfu+ (1-BETA1)*(ALPHA*welfcv+ (1-ALPHA)*welfcf );
uu_ star=c_ star+JEI*h_ star-(exp(nc_ star)^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA);
welfu_ star=uu_star+BETA*welfu_ star(+1);
ucv_ star=c1v_ star+JEI*h1v_ star-(exp(nc1_ star)^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA);
welfcv_ star=ucv_star+BETA1*welfcv_ star(+1);
ucf_ star=c1f_ star+JEI*h1f_ star-(exp(nc1f_ star)^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA);
welfcf_ star=ucf_ star+BETA1*welfcf_ star(+1);
welf_ star= (1-BETA)*welfu_ star+ (1-BETA1)*(ALPHA_STAR*welfcv_ star
+ (1-ALPHA_STAR)*welfcf_ star);
welfun ion=NA*welf+ (1-NA)*welf_ star;
//%                            
//%
//% COUNTRY A
//%
//%                            
//% PATIENT HOUSEHOLDS
//% real budget constra int
exp(ca) + exp(ucb-uca)*exp(cb) + exp(q+h) + exp(bu) = (1-DH)*exp(q+h(-1))
+ exp(log(1-MUC)+ log(GAMMA)+Y-X) + (1-1/exp(X))*exp(Y)
+ exp(ra(-1)-dpa+bu(-1)) + d - exp(a_c)*exp(r(-1)-dpa)*d(-1) - 0 .0001*d^2/2
+ (1-ALPHA)*exp(bf(-1))*(exp(rbar(-1)-dpa)-exp(ra(-1)-dpa)) ;
//% Saving=borrow ing
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exp(bu)=ALPHA*exp(b)+ (1-ALPHA)*exp(bf );
//% housing
exp(q+uca) =exp(log(JEI)+a_ j1-h) + BETA*(exp(q(+1)+uca(+1))) ;
//% euler
exp(uca) = BETA*exp(ra-dpa(+1)+uca(+1)) ;
//% nfa
exp(uca)*(1-0 .0001*d) = BETA*exp(r-dpa(+1)+uca(+1)+a_c) ;
//% lab or supply
( exp(nc)^(1-NU) )^((ETA+NU)/(1-NU)) * exp(nc)^(-NU)
= exp( log(1-MUC)+ log(GAMMA)+Y-X -nc +uca) ;
//% IMPATIENT HOUSEHOLDS
//VARIABLE
//% budget constra int
exp(ca1v) + exp(ucb-uca)*exp(cb1v) + exp(q+h1v) - (1-DH)*exp(q+h1v(-1)) =
exp(log(1-MUC)+ log(1-GAMMA)+Y-X) + exp(b) - exp(ra(-1)-dpa+b(-1)) ;
//% collatera l constra int
b = log(M ) + q(+1) + h1v - ra + dpa(+1) ;
//% relative marginal utilities
exp(ucb1) = exp(uca1)*exp(ucb-uca) ;
//% housing
exp(q+uca1) = exp(log(JEI)+a_ j1-h1v) +BETA1*exp(q(+1)+uca1(+1)) +
M*exp(lmv+q(+1)-ra+dpa(+1));
//% euler
exp(uca1) = BETA1*exp(ra-dpa(+1)+uca1(+1)) + exp(lmv) ;
//% lab or supply
( exp(nc1)^(1-NU) )^((ETA+NU)/(1-NU)) * exp(nc1)^(-NU)
= exp(log(1-MUC)+ log(1-GAMMA)+Y-X -nc1 +uca1) ;
//FIXED
//% budget constra int
exp(ca1f ) + exp(ucb-uca)*exp(cb1f ) + exp(q+h1f ) - (1-DH)*exp(q+h1f(-1)) =
exp(log(1-MUC)+ log(1-GAMMA)+Y-X) + exp(bf ) - exp(rbar(-1)-dpa+bf(-1)) ;
//% collatera l constra int
b f = log(M ) + q(+1) + h1f - rbar + dpa(+1) ;
//% relative marginal utilities
exp(ucb1f ) = exp(uca1f )*exp(ucb-uca) ;
//% housing
exp(q+uca1f ) = exp(log(JEI)+a_ j1-h1f ) +BETA1*exp(q(+1)+uca1f(+1)) +
M*exp(lm f+q(+1)-rbar+dpa(+1));
//% euler
exp(uca1f ) = BETA1*exp(rbar-dpa(+1)+uca1f(+1)) + exp(lm f ) ;
//% lab or supply
( exp(nc1f )^(1-NU) )^((ETA+NU)/(1-NU)) * exp(nc1f )^(-NU)
= exp(log(1-MUC)+ log(1-GAMMA)+Y-X -nc1f +uca1f ) ;
//% FIRMS
//% Production function
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Y = (1-MUC)*a_a + (1-MUC)*GAMMA*nc + (1-MUC)*(1-GAMMA)*ncc ;
//% Phillips curve
dpa - LAGP*dpa(-1) = BETA*(dpa(+1) - LAGP*dpa)
- ((1-TETA)*(1-BETA*TETA)/TETA)*(X -log(X_SS)) + eps_p ;
//% MARKET CLEARING
//% goods
(NA)*(exp(ca)+exp(ca1)) + (1-NA)*(exp(ca_ star)+ exp(ca1_ star))
= (NA)*exp(Y) - NA*0.0001*d^2/2 ;
//% housing
exp(h) + exp(h1) = 1 ;
//% VARIOUS DEFINIT IONS
exp(ca1)=ALPHA*exp(ca1v)+ (1-ALPHA)*exp(ca1f );
exp(cb1)=ALPHA*exp(cb1v)+ (1-ALPHA)*exp(cb1f );
exp(h1)=ALPHA*exp(h1v)+ (1-ALPHA)*exp(h1f );
exp(ncc)=ALPHA*exp(nc1)+ (1-ALPHA)*exp(nc1f );
//%
c = (NA+HB)*ca + (1-NA-HB)*cb ;
c1 = (NA+HB)*ca1 + (1-NA-HB)*cb1 ;
c1v = (NA+HB)*ca1v + (1-NA-HB)*cb1v ;
c1f = (NA+HB)*ca1f + (1-NA-HB)*cb1f ;
//%
exp(uca) = exp(a_z1) * ((1-EC)/(1-BETA*EC)) * ( 1 / ( exp(c) - EC * exp (c(-1)) )
- BETA * EC / ( exp(c(+1)) - EC*exp(c) ) ) * (NA+HB) * exp(c)/exp(ca) ;
exp(uca1) = exp(a_z1) * ((1-EC)/(1-BETA1*EC)) *
( 1 / ( exp(c1) - EC * exp (c1(-1)) )
- BETA1 * EC / ( exp(c1(+1)) - EC*exp(c1) ) ) * (NA+HB) * exp(c1)/exp(ca1v) ;
exp(uca1f ) = exp(a_z1) * ((1-EC)/(1-BETA1*EC)) * ( 1 / ( exp(c1)
- EC * exp (c1(-1)) ) - BETA1 * EC / ( exp(c1(+1)) - EC*exp(c1) ) )
* (NA+HB) * exp(c1)/exp(ca1f ) ;
exp(ucb) = exp(a_z1) * ((1-EC)/(1-BETA*EC)) * ( 1 / ( exp(c) - EC * exp (c(-1)) )
- BETA * EC / ( exp(c(+1)) - EC*exp(c) ) ) * (1-NA-HB) * exp(c)/exp(cb) ;
exp(ucb1) = exp(a_z1) * ((1-EC)/(1-BETA1*EC)) *
( 1 / ( exp(c1) - EC * exp (c1(-1)) )
- BETA1 * EC / ( exp(c1(+1)) - EC*exp(c1) ) ) * (1-NA-HB) * exp(c1)/exp(cb1v) ;
exp(ucb1f ) = exp(a_z1) * ((1-EC)/(1-BETA1*EC)) *
( 1 / ( exp(c1) - EC * exp (c1(-1)) )
- BETA1 * EC / ( exp(c1(+1)) - EC*exp(c1) ) ) * (1-NA-HB) * exp(c1)/exp(cb1f ) ;
//%                            
//%
//% COUNTRY B
//%
//%                            
//% STAR_PATIENT HOUSEHOLDS
//% budget constra int
//% DROP THIS EQUATION AND IMPOSE MARKET CLEARING ;
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//% relative marginal utilities
exp(ucb_ star) = exp(uca_ star)*exp(ucb-uca) ;
//% housing
exp(q_ star+ucb_star) = exp(log(JEI)+a_ j2-h_ star) + BETA*exp(q_ star(+1)+ucb_star(+1));
//% euler
exp(ucb_ star) = BETA*exp(rb-dpb(+1)+ucb_star(+1)) ;
//% nfa
exp(ucb_ star)*(1+0.0001*d) = BETA*exp(r-dpb(+1)+ucb_star(+1)+a_c) ;
//% lab or supply
( exp(nc_ star)^(1-NU) )^((ETA+NU)/(1-NU)) * exp(nc_ star)^(-NU)
= exp(log(1-MUC)+ log(GAMMA_STAR)+Y_star-X_star-nc_ star+ucb_star) ;
//% denition xed rate
exp(rbar)=1/BETA;
//% STAR_IMPATIENT HOUSEHOLDS
//VARIABLE
//% budget constra int
exp(ca1v_ star)/exp(ucb-uca) + exp(cb1v_star) + exp(q_ star+h1v_star)
- (1-DH)*exp(q_ star+h1v_star(-1)) = exp(log(1-MUC)
+ log(1-GAMMA_STAR)+Y_star-X_star) + exp(b_ star) - exp(rb(-1)
-dpb+b_star(-1)) ;
//% collatera l constra int
b_ star = log(M_STAR) + q_star(+1) + h1v_star - rb + dpb(+1) ;
//% relative marginal utilities
exp(ucb1_ star) = exp(uca1_ star)*exp(ucb-uca) ;
//% housing
exp(q_ star+ucb1_star) = exp(log(JEI)+a_ j2-h1v_ star) +
BETA1*exp(q_ star(+1)+ucb1_ star(+1)) +
M_STAR*exp(lmv_star+q_star(+1)-rb+dpb(+1));
//% euler
exp(ucb1_ star) = BETA1*exp(rb-dpb(+1)+ucb1_ star(+1)) + exp(lmv_star) ;
//% lab or supply
( exp(nc1_ star)^(1-NU) )^((ETA+NU)/(1-NU)) * exp(nc1_ star)^(-NU)
= exp(log(1-MUC)+ log(1-GAMMA_STAR)+Y_star-X_star-nc1_ star+ucb1_star) ;
//FIXED
//% STAR_10
exp(ca1f_ star)/exp(ucb-uca) + exp(cb1f_ star) + exp(q_ star+h1f_ star)
- (1-DH)*exp(q_ star+h1f_ star(-1)) = exp(log(1-MUC)+ log(1-GAMMA_STAR)
+Y_star-X_star) + exp(bf_ star) - exp(rbar(-1)-dpb+bf_ star(-1)) ;
//% collatera l constra int
b f_ star = log(M_STAR) + q_star(+1) + h1f_ star - rbar + dpb(+1) ;
//% relative marginal utilities
exp(ucb1f_ star) = exp(uca1f_ star)*exp(ucb-uca) ;
//% housing
exp(q_ star+ucb1f_ star) = exp(log(JEI)+a_ j2-h1f_ star) +
BETA1*exp(q_ star(+1)+ucb1f_ star(+1)) +
100
M_STAR*exp(lm f_ star+q_star(+1)-rbar+dpb(+1));
//% euler
exp(ucb1f_ star) = BETA1*exp(rbar-dpb(+1)+ucb1f_ star(+1)) + exp(lm f_ star) ;
//% lab or supply
( exp(nc1f_ star)^(1-NU) )^((ETA+NU)/(1-NU)) * exp(nc1f_ star)^(-NU)
= exp(log(1-MUC)+ log(1-GAMMA_STAR)+Y_star-X_star-nc1f_ star+ucb1f_ star) ;
//% STAR_FIRMS
//% Production function
Y_star = (1-MUC)*a_a + (1-MUC)*GAMMA_STAR*nc_ star
+ (1-MUC)*(1-GAMMA_STAR)*ncc_ star ;
//% Phillips curve
dpb - LAGP*dpb(-1) = BETA*(dpb(+1) - LAGP*dpb)
- ((1-TETA)*(1-BETA*TETA)/TETA)*(X_star-log(X_SS)) + eps_p ;
//% STAR_MARKET CLEARING
//% goods
(1-NA)*( exp(cb_ star)+ exp(cb1_ star))
+ (NA)*(exp(cb)+exp(cb1)) = (1-NA)*exp(Y_star) - 0 .0001*NA*(d/exp(ucb-uca))^2/2;
//% housing
exp(h_ star) + exp(h1_ star) = 1 ;
//% STAR_VARIOUS DEFINIT IONS
exp(ca1_ star)=ALPHA_STAR*exp(ca1v_ star)+ (1-ALPHA_STAR)*exp(ca1f_ star);
exp(cb1_ star)=ALPHA_STAR*exp(cb1v_ star)+ (1-ALPHA_STAR)*exp(cb1f_ star);
exp(h1_ star)=ALPHA_STAR*exp(h1v_ star)+ (1-ALPHA_STAR)*exp(h1f_ star);
exp(ncc_ star)=ALPHA_STAR*exp(nc1_ star)+ (1-ALPHA_STAR)*exp(nc1f_ star);
//%
c_star = (NA-HB)*ca_ star + (1-NA+HB)*cb_ star ;
c1_ star = (NA-HB)*ca1_ star + (1-NA+HB)*cb1_ star ;
c1v_ star = (NA-HB)*ca1v_ star + (1-NA+HB)*cb1v_ star ;
c1f_ star = (NA-HB)*ca1f_ star + (1-NA+HB)*cb1f_ star ;
//%
exp(uca_ star) = exp(a_z2) * ((1-EC)/(1-BETA*EC)) *
( 1 / ( exp(c_ star) - EC * exp (c_ star(-1)) ) -
BETA * EC / ( exp(c_ star(+1)) - EC*exp(c_ star) ) ) * (NA-HB)
* exp(c_ star)/exp(ca_ star) ;
exp(uca1_ star) = exp(a_z2) * ((1-EC_STAR)/(1-BETA1*EC_STAR)) *
( 1 / ( exp(c1_ star) - EC_STAR * exp (c1_ star(-1)) ) -
BETA1 * EC_STAR / ( exp(c1_ star(+1)) - EC_STAR*exp(c1_ star) ) )
* (NA-HB) * exp(c1_ star)/exp(ca1v_ star) ;
exp(uca1f_ star) = exp(a_z2) * ((1-EC_STAR)/(1-BETA1*EC_STAR)) *
( 1 / ( exp(c1_ star) - EC_STAR * exp (c1_ star(-1)) ) -
BETA1 * EC_STAR / ( exp(c1_ star(+1)) - EC_STAR*exp(c1_ star) ) )
* (NA-HB) * exp(c1_ star)/exp(ca1f_ star) ;
exp(ucb_ star) = exp(a_z2) * ((1-EC_STAR)/(1-BETA*EC_STAR)) *
( 1 / ( exp(c_ star) - EC_STAR * exp (c_ star(-1)) ) -
BETA * EC_STAR / ( exp(c_ star(+1)) - EC_STAR*exp(c_ star) ) )
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* (1-NA+HB) * exp(c_ star)/exp(cb_ star) ;
exp(ucb1_ star) = exp(a_z2) * ((1-EC_STAR)/(1-BETA1*EC_STAR)) *
( 1 / ( exp(c1_ star) - EC_STAR * exp (c1_ star(-1)) )
- BETA1 * EC_STAR / ( exp(c1_ star(+1)) - EC_STAR*exp(c1_ star) ) )
* (1-NA+HB) * exp(c1_ star)/exp(cb1v_ star) ;
exp(ucb1f_ star) = exp(a_z2) * ((1-EC_STAR)/(1-BETA1*EC_STAR)) *
( 1 / ( exp(c1_ star) - EC_STAR * exp (c1_ star(-1)) )
- BETA1 * EC_STAR / ( exp(c1_ star(+1)) - EC_STAR*exp(c1_ star) ) )
* (1-NA+HB) * exp(c1_ star)/exp(cb1f_ star) ;
//%                            
//%
//% AREA-W IDE EQUATIONS
//%
//%                            
//% Taylor ru le
r = TAYLOR_R*r(-1) + (1-TAYLOR_R)*(1+TAYLOR_P)*(NA*dpa+ (1-NA)*dpb)
+ (1-TAYLOR_R)*log(1/BETA) + eps_e ;
//% Denition of relative price
dpb = ucb - uca - ucb(-1) + uca(-1) + dpa ;
//% Denitions
data_CCA = (exp(ca) + exp(ca1) + exp(cb) + exp(cb1)) ;
data_CCB = (exp(cb_ star) + exp(cb1_ star) + exp(ca_ star) + exp(ca1_ star)) ;
data_DPE = NA*dpa+ (1-NA)*dpb ;
data_QQA = q - QQ_SS ;
data_QQB = q_star - QQ_SS_star ;
data_RRE = r - log(1/BETA) ;
GDPA=exp(ca) + exp(ca1) + exp(ca_ star) + exp(ca1_ star) ;
GDPB=exp(cb) + exp(cb1) + exp(cb_ star) + exp(cb1_ star) ;
//% STOCHASTIC PROCESSES FOR THE SHOCKS
a_a = RHO_AA * a_a(-1) + eps_a ;
a_c = RHO_AC * a_c(-1) + eps_c ;
a_ j1 = RHO_AJ1 * a_ j1(-1) + eps_ j1 ;
a_ j2 = RHO_AJ2 * a_ j2(-1) + eps_ j2 ;
a_z1 = RHO_AZ1 * a_z1(-1) + eps_z1 ;
a_z2 = RHO_AZ2 * a_z2(-1) + eps_z2 ;
end ;
//%                   
//% Call steady state
//%                   
steady(solve_algo=0) ;
//%                   
//% Declare sho cks
//%                   
shocks;
var eps_a ; stderr 100*STDERR_AA ;
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//var eps_c ; stderr STDERR_AC ;
//var eps_e ; stderr 100*STDERR_AE ;
//var eps_ j1 ; stderr 100*STDERR_AJ1 ;
//var eps_ j2 ; stderr 100*STDERR_AJ2 ;
//var eps_p ; stderr STDERR_AP ;
//var eps_z1 ; stderr STDERR_AZ1 ;
//var eps_z2 ; stderr STDERR_AZ2 ;
end ;
sto ch_ simul(dr_algo=0,order=2,irf=0) welfu welfu_ star welfcv welfcf welfcv_ star welfcf_ star welfun ion welf welf_ star ;
Steady-State File
function [ys,check]=name_steadystate(junk,ys)
g lobal NU X_SS MUC MUH M DH DKH DKC BETA BETA1 ys
global JEI logxxx ZETA0 ZETA1 ZETA2 ZETA3
global GAMMA r ALPHA ALPHA_STAR
global CC_SS RR_SS QQ_SS R_SS
global ETA
global q h h1 c c1 CC b uh uh1 CY q_star h_ star h1_ star
global CC_star
global CHI1 CHI2 CHI3 CHI4 CHI5 CHI6 R1
global wh wh1 wc wc1 xxx
global H1_SS H_SS NA
global QQ_SS_star H1_SS_star
global CC_SS_star Q I Q I_ star
global GDP GDP_star DEBT DEBT_star HOUSING HOUSING_star
global M_STAR GAMMA_STAR HB
% Nom inal, rea l rates and ination
R_SS = 1/BETA ;
R1 = R_SS-1;
dpa = 1 ;
dpb = 1 ;
r = 1 / BETA ;
ra = r ;
rb = r ;
rbar= r;
d = 1 ;
check=0;
ZETA0 = BETA*MUC/(1-BETA*(1-DKC))/X_SS ;
ZETA1 = BETA*MUH/(1-BETA*(1-DKH));
ZETA2 = JEI/(1-BETA*(1-DH)) ;
ZETA3 = JEI/(1-BETA1*(1-DH)-(BETA-BETA1)*M ) ;
ZETA0_STAR = BETA*MUC/(1-BETA*(1-DKC))/X_SS ;
ZETA1_STAR = BETA*MUH/(1-BETA*(1-DKH));
ZETA2_STAR = JEI/(1-BETA*(1-DH)) ;
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ZETA3_STAR = JEI/(1-BETA1*(1-DH)-(BETA-BETA1)*M_STAR) ;
CHI1 = 1+DH*ZETA2*(1-R1*ZETA1-GAMMA*(1-MUH)) ;
CHI2 = (R1*ZETA1+GAMMA*(1-MUH))*DH*ZETA3+R1*BETA*M*ZETA3 ;
CHI3 = (X_SS-1+R1*ZETA0*X_SS+GAMMA*(1-MUC))/X_SS ;
CHI4 = 1+DH*ZETA3*(1-(1-GAMMA)*(1-MUH))+R1*BETA*M*ZETA3 ;
CHI5 = (1-GAMMA)*(1-MUH)*DH*ZETA2 ;
CHI6 = (1-GAMMA)*(1-MUC)/X_SS ;
CHI1_STAR = 1+DH*ZETA2_STAR*(1-R1*ZETA1_STAR-GAMMA_STAR*(1-MUH));
CHI2_STAR = (R1*ZETA1_STAR+GAMMA_STAR*(1-MUH))*DH*ZETA3_STAR+R1*BETA*M_STAR*ZETA3_STAR ;
CHI3_STAR = (X_SS-1+R1*ZETA0_STAR*X_SS+GAMMA_STAR*(1-MUC))/X_SS ;
CHI4_STAR = 1+DH*ZETA3_STAR*(1-(1-GAMMA_STAR)*(1-MUH))+R1*BETA*M_STAR*ZETA3_STAR ;
CHI5_STAR = (1-GAMMA_STAR)*(1-MUH)*DH*ZETA2_STAR ;
CHI6_STAR = (1-GAMMA_STAR)*(1-MUC)/X_SS ;
CY = (CHI3*CHI4+CHI2*CHI6)/(CHI1*CHI4-CHI2*CHI5) ;
CY1 = (CHI1*CHI6+CHI3*CHI5)/(CHI1*CHI4-CHI2*CHI5) ;
CY_STAR = (CHI3_STAR*CHI4_STAR+CHI2_STAR*CHI6_STAR)/(CHI1_STAR*CHI4_STAR-CHI2_STAR*CHI5_STAR);
CY1_STAR = (CHI1_STAR*CHI6_STAR+CHI3_STAR*CHI5_STAR)/(CHI1_STAR*CHI4_STAR-CHI2_STAR*CHI5_STAR);
nc = ((1-MUC)*GAMMA/CY/X_SS)^(1/(1+ETA)) ;
nc1 = ((1-MUC)*(1-GAMMA)/CY1/X_SS)^(1/(1+ETA)) ;
nc1f=nc1;
ncc=nc1;
nc_ star = ((1-MUC)*GAMMA_STAR/CY_STAR/X_SS)^(1/(1+ETA)) ;
nc1_ star = ((1-MUC)*(1-GAMMA_STAR)/CY1_STAR/X_SS)^(1/(1+ETA)) ;
nc1f_ star=nc1_ star;
ncc_ star=nc1_ star;
Y = (nc^GAMMA)*(ncc^(1-GAMMA));
q=1;
Y_star = (nc_ star^GAMMA_STAR)*(ncc_ star^(1-GAMMA_STAR));
q_ star=1;
num_rpb = (CY+CY1)*Y*NA*(1-NA-HB) ;
den_ rpb = (CY_STAR+CY1_STAR)*Y_star*(1-NA)*(NA-HB) ;
rpb = num_rpb / den_ rpb ;
ca = (NA+HB)*CY*Y ;
cb = (1-NA-HB)*CY*Y/rpb ;
c = ca^(NA+HB)*cb^(1-NA-HB) ;
ca1v = (NA+HB)*CY1*Y ;
ca1f= ca1v;
ca1=ca1v;
cb1v = (1-NA-HB)*CY1*Y/rpb ;
cb1f= cb1v;
cb1=cb1v;
c1 = ca1^(NA+HB)*cb1^(1-NA-HB) ;
c1v = ca1v^(NA+HB)*cb1v^(1-NA-HB) ;
c1f = ca1f^(NA+HB)*cb1f^(1-NA-HB) ;
ca_ star = (NA-HB)*CY_STAR*Y_star*rpb ;
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cb_ star = (1-NA+HB)*CY_STAR*Y_star ;
c_ star = ca_ star^(NA-HB)*cb_ star^(1-NA+HB) ;
ca1v_ star = (NA-HB)*CY1_STAR*Y_star*rpb ;
ca1f_ star=ca1v_ star;
ca1_ star=ca1v_ star;
cb1v_ star = (1-NA+HB)*CY1_STAR*Y_star ;
cb1f_ star=cb1v_ star;
cb1_ star=cb1v_ star;
c1_ star = ca1_ star^(NA-HB)*cb1_ star^(1-NA+HB) ;
c1v_ star = ca1v_ star^(NA+HB)*cb1v_ star^(1-NA-HB) ;
c1f_ star = ca1f_ star^(NA+HB)*cb1f_ star^(1-NA-HB) ;
h = ZETA2*ca/q/(NA+HB) ;
h1v = ZETA3*ca1/q/(NA+HB) ;
h1f=h1v;
h1=h1v;
h_ star = ZETA2_STAR*cb_star/q_ star/(1-NA+HB) ;
h1v_ star = ZETA3_STAR*cb1_ star/q_ star/(1-NA+HB) ;
h1f_ star=h1v_star;
h1_ star=h1v_star;
b = BETA*M*q*h1 ;
b f=b;
bu=b;
b_ star = BETA*M_STAR*q_star*h1_ star ;
b f_ star=b_star;
lmv = (1-BETA1/BETA)/ca1*(NA+HB) ;
lmv_star = (1-BETA1/BETA)/cb1_ star*(1-NA+HB) ;
lm f= lmv;
lm f_ star= lmv_star;
uh = JEI/h ;
uh1 = JEI/h1;
uh_star = JEI/h_ star;
uh1_ star = JEI/h1_ star;
uca = (NA+HB)/ca;
uca1 = (NA+HB)/ca1;
uca1f=uca1;
ucb = (1-NA-HB)/cb ;
ucb1 = (1-NA-HB)/cb1;
ucb1f=ucb1;
uca_ star = (NA-HB)/ca_ star;
uca1_ star = (NA-HB)/ca1_ star;
uca1f_ star=uca1_ star;
ucb_ star = (1-NA+HB)/cb_ star;
ucb1_ star = (1-NA+HB)/cb1_ star;
ucb1f_ star=ucb1_ star;
CC = ca + ca1 + cb + cb1 ;
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CC_star = cb_star + cb1_ star + ca_ star + ca1_ star ;
GDP = CC ;
GDP_star = CC_star;
HOUSING = q*(h+h1) ;
HOUSING_star = q_star*(h_ star+h1_star) ;
DEBT = b ;
DEBT_star = b_star ;
GDPA=ca+ca1+ca_ star+ca1_ star;
GDPB=cb+cb1+cb_star+cb1_ star;
H_SS = log(h) ;
H1_SS = log(h1) ;
H_SS_star = log(h_ star) ;
H1_SS_star = log(h1_ star) ;
X = X_SS ;
X_star = X_SS ;
uu=exp(log(c)+JEI*log(h)-((nc)^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA));
welfu= exp(log(uu)/(1-BETA));
ucv=exp(log(c1v)+JEI*log(h1v)-((nc1)^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA));
welfcv=exp(log(ucv)/(1-BETA1));
ucf= exp(log(c1f )+JEI*log(h1f )-((nc1f )^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA));
welfcf= exp(log(ucf )/(1-BETA1));
welf= exp((1-BETA)*log(welfu)+ (1-BETA1)*(ALPHA*log(welfcv)+ (1-ALPHA)*log(welfcf )));
uu_ star=exp(log(c_ star)+JEI*log(h_ star)-((nc_ star)^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA));
welfu_ star=exp(log(uu_star)/(1-BETA));
ucv_ star=exp(log(c1v_ star)+JEI*log(h1v_ star)-((nc1_ star)^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA));
welfcv_ star=exp(log(ucv_ star)/(1-BETA1));
ucf_ star=exp(log(c1f_ star)+JEI*log(h1f_ star)-((nc1f_ star)^(1+ETA))/(1+ETA));
welfcf_ star=exp(log(ucf_ star)/(1-BETA1));
welf_ star=exp((1-BETA)*log(welfu_ star)+ (1-BETA1)*(ALPHA*log(welfcv_ star)+ (1-ALPHA)*log(welfcf_ star)));
welfun ion=exp(NA*log(welf )+ (1-NA)*log(welf_ star));
% Shocks
sho cks = 1 ;
% Log of som e variab les in steady state
CC_SS = log(CC) ;
CC_SS_star = log(CC_star);
QQ_SS = log(q) ;
QQ_SS_star = log(q_ star);
RR_SS = log(1/BETA) ;
xxx = [ ...
sho cks
sho cks
sho cks
sho cks
sho cks
sho cks
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bb_star
b f
b f_ star
bu
c
c1
c1_ star
c1f
c1f_ star
c1v
c1v_ star
c_ star
ca
ca1
ca1_ star
ca1v
ca1v_ star
ca1f
ca1f_ star
ca_ star
cb
cb1
cb1_ star
cb1v
cb1v_ star
cb1f
cb1f_ star
cb_ star
d
CC/CC
CC_star/CC_star
1
q/q
q_ star/q_ star
1
dpa
dpb
GDPA
GDPB
h
h1
h1_ star
h1v
h1v_ star
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h1f
h1f_ star
h_ star
lmv
lmv_star
lm f
lm f_ star
nc
nc1
nc1f
ncc
nc1_ star
nc_ star
nc1f_ star
ncc_ star
q
q_ star
r
ra
rb
rbar
uca
uca1
uca1_ star
uca1f
uca1f_ star
uca_ star
ucb
ucb1
ucb1_ star
ucb1f
ucb1f_ star
ucb_ star
ucf
ucf_ star
ucv
ucv_ star
uu
uu_star
welf
welf_ star
welfcf
welfcf_ star
welfcv
welfcv_ star
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welfu
welfu_ star
welfun ion
X
X_star
Y
Y_star ] ;
logxxx = log(xxx) ;
ys = logxxx ;
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